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The Two Faces of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court
EMILY BERMAN*
When former National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden leaked a
massive trove of information about secret intelligence-collection programs
implemented under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act in the summer of 2013,
U.S. surveillance activities were thrust to the forefront of public debate. This debate
included the question of whether and how to reform the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court (“FISA Court”), the statutorily created secret court that reviews
government applications to conduct surveillance in the United States. This
discussion, however, has underemphasized a critical feature of the way the FISA
Court works. As this Article will show, since the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001 (“9/11”), the FISA Court has been playing not only its traditional role of
“gatekeeper,” but also the additional—and entirely different—role of “rule maker.”
This is the first scholarly examination of this dichotomy and its implications for
reform. Further, the Article is particularly timely in providing an assessment of the
recently enacted USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, Congress’s attempt to reform the
court. I argue that, viewed through the lens of the court’s dual roles, the scholarly
and public conversation has fallen short in two important respects. First, it has failed
to give the court sufficient credit for its laudable performance as gatekeeper, and
second, it has ignored the implications that the gatekeeper/rule-maker dichotomy
has for reform. As a result, I conclude that the USA FREEDOM Act is not only
woefully inadequate to remedy the problems that it targets but also fails entirely to
address additional problems with the FISA Court. In light of these conclusions, the
USA FREEDOM Act represents a missed opportunity. In not fully appreciating or
accounting for the unique challenges that the court’s rule-making function poses, the
Act does not go nearly far enough in bolstering the court’s rulemaking competence.
Moreover, the Act neglects (as has the public debate) a critical area for reform:
ensuring sufficient flow of information from the executive branch to the FISA Court.
I therefore explore the nature of this challenge and offer some additional reform
ideas for consideration.
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INTRODUCTION
Former National Security Agency (NSA) contractor Edward Snowden’s leak of a
massive trove of information about formerly secret intelligence-collection programs
in the summer of 2013 prompted a dramatic shift in public awareness of U.S.
surveillance activities. Almost overnight, the American public learned of several
aggressive intelligence-collection programs—including programs that collected
significant amounts of information about innocent Americans—the most
controversial of which were implemented under the auspices of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA).1 These disclosures sparked vigorous
debate about U.S. surveillance policy and generated significant momentum for
statutory reform. Most reform discussion revolved around how to modify the
government’s highly controversial program of collecting and storing vast databases
of domestic telephony metadata.2 And when the surveillance debate culminated this
past summer with the enactment of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015,3 Congress did
indeed place limits on such activity.4
In addition to debate over what substantive surveillance authorities the
government should possess, however, both the Snowden revelations and the ensuing
conversation also shined a spotlight on an obscure institution: the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court (“FISA Court”).5 The FISA Court, statutorily created
as part of FISA in 1978, reviews government applications for foreign intelligence
surveillance orders—that is, confers approval to engage in surveillance. It was
created to provide judicial supervision of the federal government’s foreign
intelligence–collection activities inside the United States. Information revealed in the
wake of the Snowden leaks called into question the FISA Court’s effectiveness in
this role. One of the elements of the debate over surveillance reform thus became the
question of whether and how to reform the FISA Court itself.
This Article argues that a critical—and underappreciated—element of this
discussion is the fact that the FISA Court actually plays two very different roles. Its

1. Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (1978) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of the U.S.C.).
2. Metadata generally is defined as data that describes and gives information about other
data. Communication metadata is information about the communication per se, including
session identifying information (e.g., originating and terminating telephone number or e-mail
address, communications device identifiers like IP addresses, etc.), routing information, time
and duration of calls, and similar non-content information.
3. Pub. L. No. 114-23, 129 Stat. 268 (2015) (to be codified in scattered sections of the
U.S.C.).
4. Whether preexisting law authorized the government’s collection of phone data is a
matter of vigorous debate, but the USA FREEDOM Act plainly limits bulk collection. See
USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23 sec.103, sec. 201, 129 Stat. 268, 272, 277
(to be codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1861, 1842).
5. For details on the creation, operation, and evolution of the FISA Court, see infra
Part I.A.
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original and traditional role is that of “gatekeeper.” Since 9/11, however, the court
has been forced to play an additional, entirely distinct function—that of “rule
maker.”6
When the FISA Court operates as a gatekeeper, it acts as a watchdog. As
gatekeeper, the court evaluates whether government surveillance requests comply
with legal requirements, much the way a magistrate judge reviews applications for
search or arrest warrants.7 In other words, the court first screens government requests
to engage in surveillance of a particular target, applying clearly established law to a
specific set of circumstances and approving only those collection activities that
comply with applicable requirements and restrictions. If the court determines that a
government application should be approved, it issues an appropriate order. Matters
requiring it to play this gatekeeper function are what the FISA Court was created to
handle and still form the vast bulk of its docket.
Since 9/11, however, the court has also been asked to play a new role, what I call
its rule-maker role. This role is triggered when the court is asked whether
bulk-collection programs comply with both FISA and the Constitution. The defining
characteristic of “bulk collection” programs—in contrast to “targeted collection”
programs—is that a significant portion of the collected data is not associated with
specific targets or subjects of interest in a particular investigation. When approving
government surveillance programs that do not involve case-by-case assessments of
each proposed target, FISA judges do not simply evaluate whether a particular
surveillance request meets the necessary requirements—whether, for example, the
government has established probable cause. Rather, they must determine whether the
rules under which the government has proposed to operate while collecting
information in bulk satisfy existing law. This rule-maker responsibility represents an
enormous alteration of the FISA Court’s docket, forcing it to play a role for which it
was not designed and is not well suited.
A handful of others have recognized that the court is doing something new of late,
but this is the first scholarly article to examine closely the dichotomy between
gatekeeper and rule maker and to explore its implications for reform. I argue that
discussion surrounding the FISA Court has failed to appreciate the significance of
this dichotomy. As a result, the public conversation has fallen short in two important
respects. First, it has failed to give the court sufficient credit for its laudable
performance as gatekeeper and the extent of oversight in which it has engaged in that
capacity. Indeed, when in possession of all the relevant information, FISA
judges-as-gatekeepers have aggressively employed the equitable powers of the
courts to serve as a meaningful check on the government’s bulk surveillance
activities.8 Second, while critiques of the FISA Court in its rule-maker role are fully
justified—the court’s rulemaking has displayed incomplete analysis, relied upon

6. If the term “rule maker” invokes thoughts of administrative law, it is no accident.
What I call the FISA Court’s rule-making activities resemble nothing so much as agency rule
making. The resemblance of the FISA Court to an administrative agency, and the implications
of that resemblance, is an area for future research.
7. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. PRO. 41(d) (authorizing a warrant “if there is probable cause
to search for and seize a person or property or to install and use a tracking device”).
8. See infra Part II.A.
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unconvincing reasoning, and failed to consider important counterarguments9—they
have ignored the implications that the gatekeeper/rule-maker dichotomy has for
reform.
These conclusions permit me to turn the lens of the court’s dual roles on the
recently enacted USA FREEDOM Act to assess the sufficiency of its reforms to the
court.10 Given the court’s failure as rule maker, the USA FREEDOM Act represents
nothing so much as a missed opportunity. In not fully appreciating or accounting for
the unique challenges that the court’s rulemaking function poses, the USA
FREEDOM Act does not go nearly far enough in bolstering the court’s rulemaking
competence. It does include measures that gesture in the right direction—increasing
the adversarial nature of the FISA Court’s proceedings, augmenting the availability
of appellate review of FISA judges’ decisions, adding transparency to the court’s
operations, and increasing FISA judges’ access to technical expertise—but these will
prove woefully inadequate. Moreover, the Act neglects (as has the public debate) a
critical area for reform that will play to the FISA Court’s strength as gatekeeper:
ensuring sufficient flow of information from the executive branch to the FISA Court.
I therefore explore the nature of this challenge and offer some additional reform ideas
for consideration.
Part I of this Article will lay out first the relevant aspects of the FISA Court’s
operations and then the critiques of those operations. Part II will look closely at the
FISA Court’s performance as gatekeeper and as rule maker in the approval and
oversight of bulk-collection programs and argue that the FISA Court has performed
its gatekeeper function well while failing in its rule-maker function. Part III will
consider the implications of the FISA Court’s strengths and weaknesses, as set out
in Part II, for reform as well as critique the USA FREEDOM Act’s reforms to the
court, pointing out areas in which the Act falls short, as well as areas that it
overlooked altogether.
I. THE FISA COURT DEBATE
The FISA Court has never been entirely uncontroversial, but with the trove of new
information about the court and its operations revealed by Edward Snowden—and
by the government in response to the Snowden leaks—controversy over the court
entered the public debate like never before. Part I.A will discuss the FISA Court’s
operations, elaborating further on the court’s dual role as gatekeeper and rule maker;
Part I.B will then catalog the primary critiques leveled at those operations.
A. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
The FISA Court was created in 1978 by FISA as part of a comprehensive regime
to impose limits on and oversight of the domestic use of surveillance for the
collection of foreign intelligence.11 FISA itself was in part a response to revelations

9. See infra Part II.B.
10. USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, 129 Stat. 268 (to be codified in
scattered sections of 50 U.S.C.).
11. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783
(1978) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
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in the early 1970s that the U.S. intelligence community had for decades engaged in
unethical and illegal intelligence collection because intelligence agencies lacked
“appropriate restraints, controls, and prohibitions.”12 Recognizing that “warrantless
electronic surveillance in the name of national security ha[d] been seriously abused,”
Congress and the executive branch agreed not only to subject those activities to
substantive limits but also to employ Article III judges in ensuring that those limits
were respected.13 As Senator Birch Bayh stated during the original Senate debate on
FISA, the Act was intended to “bring an end to the practice of electronic surveillance
by the executive branch without a court order in the United States.”14 The result was
the FISA Court.
The court itself currently comprises eleven federal judges, chosen by the Chief
Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court from among sitting U.S. district court judges, to
serve staggered seven-year terms.15 The membership of the FISA Court at any given
time is public information, but the vast majority of its work—its proceedings, orders,
and opinions—has traditionally remained secret.16 FISA also created a FISA Court
of Review, made up of three federal district or appeals court judges appointed by the
Chief Justice, to hear appeals from decisions of judges on the FISA Court.17
While the contemporary FISA Court plays two roles, it was originally designed
to play just one—gatekeeper. As law and technology have changed over time,
however, it has taken on a second role—rule maker. The balance of this Part will
specify what each of those roles encompasses and the FISA Court procedures
through which they are exercised.

12. SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS, INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
171 (1976) [hereinafter CHURCH
COMM. REPORT], available at http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files
/94755_II.pdf [https://perma.cc/3KAY-GZ9N].
13. SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF
1978, S. REP. NO. 95-604, pt. 1, at 7 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3904, 3908; see
also CHURCH COMM. REPORT, supra note 12, at 292 (identifying excessive concentration of
power in the executive as one source of rights violations).
14. 124 CONG. REC. 10889–90 (1978) (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh); see also Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, &
the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 28–29 (1976) (statement
of Hon. Philip Lacovara, former Deputy Solicitor General) (noting that FISA required judicial
involvement because “the courts, from the earliest time, have been regarded as the bulwarks
of liberty against executive excesses,” and because executive branch officials exercise greater
self-restraint when forced “to justify [decisions] to someone else”).
15. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1803(a), (d) (West 2015). The FISA Court originally comprised seven
judges; that number was expanded to eleven in the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001. Pub. L. No.
107-56, sec. 208, § 103(a), 115 Stat. 272, 283 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a)).
16. See Current Membership—Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, U.S. FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE CT., http://www.fisc.uscourts.gov/current-membership
[https://perma.cc/B3D5-8CRX]. The USA FREEDOM Act aims to make more opinions and
orders public, but FISA Court proceedings will remain secret. USA FREEDOM Act of
2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, sec. 402, § 602, 129 Stat. 268, 281–82 (to be codified at 50 U.S.C.
§ 1872).
17. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1803(b).
AND RIGHTS OF AMERICANS: BOOK II, S. REP. NO. 94-755, at
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1. The FISA Court’s Original Role: Gatekeeper
Prior to the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act in 200118—which amended
portions of FISA—and the FISA Amendments Act of 2008,19 the nature of FISA’s
statutory requirements for intelligence collection dictated a narrow scope for the
court’s operations. Its role was limited to evaluating ex parte applications for
intelligence collection directed at specific, individual targets.20 Indeed, at the time of
FISA’s passage, the fact that FISA judges would be “applying the law to the facts of
a particular case” alleviated concerns that the ex parte nature of the court’s
proceedings might violate Article III’s case or controversy requirement.21 This is
what I call the court’s gatekeeper function.
As gatekeepers, FISA judges’ evaluations of applications for
intelligence-collection orders are analogous to that of magistrate judges considering
applications for search warrants or wiretapping authority in the criminal context.22
The FISA judge must make an independent determination of whether the government
has met the standard necessary. Before approving electronic surveillance of an
individual’s communications inside the United States, for example, the FISA judge
must determine that there is probable cause to believe that the target of the
surveillance is either a foreign power or its agent, that the places at which the
surveillance is targeted are used by the foreign power or its agent,23 and that the
government’s proposed minimization procedures—procedures designed to limit the
acquisition, retention, and dissemination of nonpublicly available information about
unconsenting United States persons—satisfy the statutory standard.24 Only after

18. Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
the U.S.C.).
19. Pub. L. No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436 (2008) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of the U.S.C.).
20. The applications, which require the Attorney General’s approval, are generated in the
National Security Division—a division of the Department of Justice—on behalf of, and in
coordination with, the agency requesting surveillance authority. Letter from Hon. Reggie B.
Walton, Presiding Judge, U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, to Hon. Patrick J.
Leahy, Chairman, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, at 2 n.3 (July 29, 2013). The NSA
implements approved requests for signals-intelligence collection—intelligence derived from
electronic signals and systems, such as communications systems, radars, and weapons
systems. NSA, THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY: MISSIONS, AUTHORITIES, OVERSIGHT AND
PARTNERSHIPS 2 (2013), available at https://www.nsa.gov/public_info/_files/speeches
_testimonies/2013_08_09_the_nsa_story.pdf [https://perma.cc/7LX2-4FW7].
21. ELIZABETH GOITEIN & FAIZA PATEL, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, WHAT WENT
WRONG WITH THE FISA COURT 7 (2015).
22. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (discussing search and seizure warrants); see
also 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 (2012) (setting out rules governing electronic surveillance in the
domestic criminal context).
23. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1805(a)(2) (West 2015).
24. Id. § 1805(a)(3). Minimization procedures are defined as:
(1) specific procedures . . . to minimize the acquisition and retention, and prohibit
the dissemination, of nonpublicly available information concerning unconsenting
United States persons . . . ;
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determining that the government has successfully established each of these elements
may the court issue an order approving the surveillance.
The FISA Court’s jurisdiction originally was limited to oversight of electronic
surveillance, but over time it has expanded to cover physical searches, the use of pen
registers/trap-and-trace devices (pen/traps),25 and the production of tangible things
as well.26 Each of these surveillance methods has its own requirements that the
government must meet.27 Should the judge require additional information to make
the required determinations, she may require the applicant to furnish it.28
Evaluation of these types of applications demands a narrow inquiry into whether
the government has adequately satisfied FISA’s defined requirements. In other
words, the question is whether the government has included all of the required
elements in its application and successfully established the necessary standard—for
example, probable cause, in the case of electronic surveillance. If each requirement
is met, the FISA judge may issue an order permitting the requested activity.29
So as originally conceived, a FISA judge’s job is to evaluate government requests
for authority to collect intelligence from a specific person, and from a specific place
or communications device, and to ensure that the government’s implementation of
that authority complies with constitutional, statutory, and judicially ordered limits.30
In performing this work, FISA judges are primarily assisted not by the usual cadre
of clerks culled from recent law school graduates, but instead by full-time legal
counsel who are employees of the Justice Department.

(2) procedures that require that nonpublicly available information, which is not
foreign intelligence information . . . shall not be disseminated in a manner that
identifies any United States person, without such person’s consent, unless such
person’s identity is necessary to understand foreign intelligence information or
assess its importance;
(3) . . . procedures that allow for the retention and dissemination of information
that is evidence of a crime . . . ; and
(4) . . . procedures that require that no contents of any communication to which
a United States person is a party shall be disclosed, disseminated, or used for any
purpose or retained for longer than 72 hours . . . .
50 U.S.C.A. § 1801(h) (West 2015).
25. Pen registers record outgoing communications metadata; trap-and-trace devices
record the incoming information. See infra note 38.
26. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1861 (West 2015).
27. To acquire business records, the government must establish that there are “reasonable
grounds to believe that the tangible things sought are relevant to an authorized investigation.”
Id. § 1861(b)(2)(A). For a pen/trap order, the government must show that the information
“likely to be obtained is foreign intelligence information . . . or is relevant to an ongoing
investigation.” 50 U.S.C.A. § 1842(c)(2) (West 2015).
28. 50 U.S.C. § 1804(c) (2012).
29. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1805(a) (West 2015).
30. For a more detailed discussion of courts’ ex parte review of government applications,
see Orin S. Kerr, A Rule of Lenity for National Security Surveillance Law, 100 VA. L. REV.
1513, 1516–18 (2014).
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2. The FISA Court’s New Role: Rule Maker
After 9/11, the FISA Court’s role expanded beyond assessing the lawfulness of
requests for intelligence-collection orders directed at a particular target. Instead, it
has also been asked to approve a very different kind of surveillance—bulk
surveillance. Bulk surveillance refers to broad collections programs that do not
require judicial approval on a case-by-case basis. Rather than determining the
lawfulness of a particular instance of surveillance, the court pronounces whether an
entire surveillance program complies with the statute and the Constitution. Issuing
opinions regarding the validity of programmatic or bulk-collection programs—what
I refer to as the FISA Court’s rule making—represents a sea change in the court’s
responsibilities.
The FISA Court has authorized at least three bulk-collection programs since
9/11, some more controversial than others. The most controversial is the bulk
collection of all domestic telephony metadata pursuant to section 215 of the USA
PATRIOT Act, also known as the FISA business records provision.31 Section 215
permits the government to collect “any tangible thing[]” that is “relevant” to an
ongoing investigation.32 Under this provision, the government can
noncontroversially engage in targeted collection—to access a suspected foreign
agent’s banking information or credit card records, for example. Under the
bulk-collection program, however—referred to variously as the section 215
program, the telephony metadata program, or the telephone bulk-collection
program—the NSA did not seek out specific items related to a specific target.
Instead, it collected telecommunications companies’ entire databases of records for
all domestic phone calls. The information collected included (at a minimum) the
telephone numbers dialed and the dates, times, and duration of calls.33 The NSA
could then “query,” or search, this database using terms, known as “seed identifiers”
(usually phone numbers), in an effort to identify as-yet-unknown terrorist suspects.34
After the section 215 program became public, President Obama curtailed its scope
slightly;35 it was then permitted to expire just prior to the passage of the USA

31. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1861(a)(1) (the FBI “may make an application for an order requiring
the production of any tangible things . . . for an investigation to obtain foreign intelligence
information not concerning a United States person or to protect against international terrorism
or clandestine intelligence activities, provided that such investigation of a United States person
is not conducted solely upon the basis of activities protected by the first amendment to the
Constitution”).
32. Id.
33. ADMINISTRATION WHITE PAPER: BULK COLLECTION OF TELEPHONY METADATA
UNDER SECTION 215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT 3 (2013) [hereinafter ADMINISTRATION
SECTION 215 WHITE PAPER].
34. One method through which this is attempted is known as “contact chaining,” or
analysis of the connections between seed identifiers and others. PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES
OVERSIGHT BD., REPORT ON THE TELEPHONE RECORDS PROGRAM CONDUCTED UNDER SECTION
215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT AND ON THE OPERATIONS OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
SURVEILLANCE COURT 8–9 (2014) [hereinafter PCLOB SECTION 215 REPORT].
35. Remarks on United States Signals Intelligence and Electronic Surveillance Programs,
2014 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 6–7 (Jan. 17, 2014) [hereinafter Remarks on United States
Signals Intelligence].
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FREEDOM Act, which enacted several modifications to section 215 itself.36 The
second bulk-collection program under the FISA Court’s oversight (voluntarily
discontinued by the executive branch in 2011)37 allowed bulk collection of Internet
metadata through the use of the FISA pen/trap provision.38 The third bulk-collection
program, which is currently ongoing, is known as the section 702 program—named
for a statutory provision of the FISA Amendments Act—which authorizes the bulk
collection of the contents of communications when the target is reasonably believed
to be outside the United States, even if the target’s interlocutor is in the United
States.39 Under these bulk-collection programs, the court need not approve each
surveillance target; indeed, it likely does not know what the specific targets of
surveillance will be.
I am not the first to recognize the novelty of this role. Indeed some have argued
that adding this function to a court designed to operate only as a mechanism to
approve individualized surveillance is at best unwise and at worst unconstitutional.40
But even assuming that assigning the FISA Court a rule making role is neither unwise
nor unconstitutional, it is crucial to recognize just how different it is. Both former
FISA Court Judge James Robertson and an independent commission established by
President Obama in the wake of the Snowden revelations—the President’s Review
Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies (President’s Review
Group)—noted the change.41 During his time on the court, Robertson explained,

36. Jennifer Steinhauer & Jonathan Weisman, Key Parts of Patriot Act Expire
Temporarily as Senate Moves Toward Limits on Spying, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2015,
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/01/us/politics/senate-nsa-surveillance-usa-freedom-act.html?_r=0
[https://perma.cc/CXZ4-8HH6]; Jennifer Steinhauer & Jonathan Weisman, U.S. Surveillance
in Place Since 9/11 Is Sharply Limited, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com
/2015/06/03/us/politics/senate-surveillance-bill-passes-hurdle-but-showdown-looms.html
[https://perma.cc/JY2D-8XQ7].
37. See Charlie Savage, File Says N.S.A. Found Way To Replace Email Program, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 19, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/20/us/politics/records-show-email
-analysis-continued-after-nsa-program-ended.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/432R-9PGG].
38. Pen registers record outgoing communication information, such as the numbers called
from a particular phone; trap-and-trace devices record information about incoming
communications. See generally 50 U.S.C.A. § 1842 (West 2015) (permitting “the installation
and use of a pen register or trap and trace device for any investigation to obtain foreign
intelligence information not concerning a United States person or to protect against
international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities, provided that such investigation
of a United States person is not conducted solely upon the basis of activities protected by the
first amendment to the Constitution”).
39. Pub. L. No. 110-261, § 702, 122 Stat. 2436, 2438–48 (2008) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
40. E.g., GOITEIN & PATEL, supra note 21, at 29–32.
41. Id. at 30. President Obama established the President’s Review Group, shortly after the
Snowden leak, to determine how “the United States can employ its technical collection
capabilities in a manner that optimally protects our national security and advances our foreign
policy while respecting our commitment to privacy and civil liberties.” Press Release,
Statement by the Press Secretary on the Review Group on Intelligence and Communications
Technology (Aug. 27, 2013), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office
/2013/08/27/statement-press-secretary-review-group-intelligence-and-communications-t
[https://perma.cc/3ARC-YJT5].
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judges had no need to issue opinions. “You approved a warrant application or you
didn’t, period.”42 In other words, the job was limited to gatekeeping. But the
evolution of both technology and the law has “introduced a new role” for the FISA
Court, turning it into “something like an administrative agency which makes and
approves rules for others to follow.”43
Congress explicitly expanded the FISA Court’s role in the FISA Amendments Act
of 2008 (FAA), which authorizes electronic surveillance in the absence of the type
of specific inquiry that had formed the content of a FISA judge’s work for the court’s
first thirty years.44 Under the FAA, so long as the target is “reasonably believed to
be located outside the United States” and is not a U.S. person, electronic surveillance
is permissible.45 But under the FAA, the FISA judge is not asked to determine
whether the government has established probable cause that the proposed target is
“reasonably believed to be located outside the United States.” That is to say, the
judge never determines whether an individual person, or an individual facility, meets
specific requirements. Instead, the statute requires the judge to review the
government’s rules for targeting and decide whether those rules, in the abstract, are
sufficiently likely to yield permissible targets.46 So the question for the FISA judge
becomes whether the government’s targeting procedures are designed in such a way
that, when used by the executive branch to select targets, those selected targets are
“reasonably believed to be located outside the United States.” Similarly, the judge
must assess whether the government’s proposed rules governing minimization, in the
abstract, provide sufficient protection to U.S. person information.47 In other words,
the court must assess the statutory and constitutional sufficiency of the entirety of
the program, rather than assessing whether any given proposed target falls within
FISA’s purview. In reviewing whether the government’s proposed targeting and
minimization procedures were sufficiently likely to yield permissible surveillance
activities, the court is not adjudicating the validity of an instance of government
surveillance; it is making and approving rules that government agencies are bound
to follow. In other words, the FAA forced the FISA Court to become a rule maker.

42. PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., WORKSHOP REGARDING
SURVEILLANCE PROGRAMS OPERATED PURSUANT TO SECTION 215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT
& SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT 90 (2013) [hereinafter
PCLOB WORKSHOP] (statement of Hon. James Robertson). Robertson sat on the FISA Court
from 2002–2005. Stephen Braun, Former FISA Judge Says Secret Court Is Flawed, YAHOO!
NEWS (July 9, 2013), available at https://www.yahoo.com/news/former-fisa-judge-says
-secret-court-flawed-201422173.html?ref=gs [https://perma.cc/U4DV-7STH].
43. Id. at 36 (statement of Hon. James Robertson); see also PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GRP. ON
INTELLIGENCE AND COMMC’NS TECHS., LIBERTY AND SECURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD 203
(2013) [hereinafter PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GRP. REPORT]. The President’s Review Group’s final
report made forty-six recommendations, including several specifically related to the FISA
Court. Id. at 200–08.
44. PCLOB WORKSHOP, supra note 42, at 36 (statement of Hon. James Robertson)
(“Congress passed the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 and introduced a new role for the [FISA
Court], which was to approve surveillance programs.”).
45. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1881a(b)(3), (g)(2) (West 2015).
46. Id. § 1881a(i)(2).
47. Id.
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Questions regarding bulk collection posed by the section 215 metadata program
arose out of both legal and technological changes.48 Prior to 9/11, to secure an order
under section 215, the government had to provide “specific and articulable facts
giving reason to believe that the person to whom the records pertain is a foreign
power or an agent of a foreign power.”49 In October 2001, the USA PATRIOT Act
amended the provision so that an order requires merely “a statement of facts showing
that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the tangible things sought are
relevant to an authorized investigation.”50 This new version of section 215 seems to
require individualized surveillance approval, albeit according to a lower standard.
Unbeknownst to the public, however, the government advocated for a novel legal
interpretation of section 215 that would allow the NSA to take advantage of
technological capacities to collect and retain information about a vast number of
individuals in order to search for information relevant to an investigation later. Thus,
when faced with the initial government application seeking telecommunications
companies’ database of records for all domestic phone calls, the FISA judge on duty
that week had to assess whether section 215 could be interpreted to permit such
collection.51 In approving the program, the FISA Court ruled that the collection of an
entire database was permissible under section 215, so long as the government queried
that information using only search terms for which there was “reasonable articulable
suspicion” that the term was related to international terrorism.52 Rather than making
a determination itself with respect to whether each search term satisfied the
“reasonable articulable suspicion” standard, however, the court ceded to the
government the authority to make that determination for itself. In other words, it set
out the rule by which the government was authorized to access the bulk data and left
it to the government to follow that rule.
A similar question had previously arisen in the context of the bulk collection of
Internet communications metadata under FISA’s pen/trap provision. Recognizing
that it was asking the court to do something unusual, the government submitted
lengthy briefs setting out its desired interpretation of the pen/trap provision as part
of its initial application for approval.53 And the assigned FISA judge issued a lengthy
opinion explaining her reasoning in approving the practice.54 So both the government
and the FISA Court itself have recognized that the post-9/11 surveillance statutes, or
the government’s interpretation of those statutes, have resulted in a massive
modification of the FISA Court’s responsibilities. Despite these substantive
modifications to the court’s responsibilities, however, there have been only minor

48. Kerr, supra note 30, at 1522 (stating that because surveillance agencies are “at the
leading edge” of quickly evolving technology, ambiguities in surveillance statutes are likely
to develop).
49. 50 U.S.C. § 1862(b)(2)(B) (2000).
50. 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2)(A) (2012).
51. Kerr, supra note 30, at 1528–30.
52. See infra text accompanying notes 101–03.
53. Memorandum of Law and Fact in Support of Application for Pen Registers and Trap
and Trace Devices for Foreign Intelligence Purposes, In re [REDACTED], No. PR/TT
[REDACTED] (FISA Ct. 2004).
54. Opinion and Order, In re [REDACTED], No. PR/TT [REDACTED] (FISA Ct. July
14, 2004) [hereinafter Judge Kollar-Kotelly’s Pen/Trap Opinion].
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changes to the court’s procedures. As a result, a court designed to accomplish one
purpose is now being asked to add another, but without any consideration of whether
the court’s design can accommodate that new purpose. As I discuss in Part II.B, it
turns out that the FISA Court’s original design is not well suited to the new task of
rule making.
B. Critiques of the FISA Court
Critiques of the FISA Court have come from a spectrum of sources—academic
commentators, privacy and civil liberties advocates, government review boards, and
even former members of the court itself. Each of them has consistently focused on a
similar set of concerns related to the court’s operation—the most frequent points
focus on the court’s nonadversarial nature and the resulting scarcity of appeals as
well as its lack of transparency. Other concerns surround the way the FISA judges
are selected and whether the court has the information it needs.
1. The FISA Court’s Proceedings Are Not Adversarial
Prior to 2007, FISA contemplated no adversarial proceedings at all. But Congress
seems to have recognized that it was changing the FISA Court’s role when it included
in the FISA Amendments Act a provision under which recipients of FISA Court
orders requiring them to provide information about their subscribers could challenge
those orders in an adversarial proceeding.55 Because the court would no longer
provide a judicial check on the executive branch’s targeting decisions, Congress
looked for another means to challenge executive branch actions. This mechanism has
proved toothless, however, because it allows recipients of orders (communications
service providers) to challenge them, but not targets of orders (those being
surveilled). Service providers rarely will have the incentive necessary to prompt them
to challenge government orders. To date, just one service provider—Yahoo—has
availed itself of this opportunity pursuant to the Protect America Act of 2007, the
precursor to the FISA Amendments Act, and none has done so under the FISA
Amendments Act itself. Congress did not include even this watered-down adversarial
process in the FISA Court’s other rule-making contexts. In addition to this one
adversarial matter, there have been a handful of instances in which a FISA judge has
entertained various motions from nongovernmental entities or agreed to permit some
to participate as amici.56 The frequency with which the FISA Court has overseen
adversarial proceedings is thus vanishingly small.
The FISA Court has been strongly criticized for its dearth of adversarial
proceedings. Adversarial proceedings are the norm in the United States’ judicial

55. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1881a(h)(4)(A) (West 2015) (providing that communication service
providers who receive an order under section 702 “may file a petition to modify or set aside
such directive” with the FISA Court). The provision was initially enacted in the Protect
America Act of 2007 (PAA). Pub. L. No. 110-55, sec. 2, § 105B, 121 Stat. 552, 552 (2007)
(allowing the government to acquire “foreign intelligence information concerning persons
reasonably believed to be outside the United States”) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1805b)
(repealed). When the FISA Amendments Act took the PAA’s place, it retained this provision.
56. Letter from Hon. Reggie B. Walton, supra note 20, at 9–10 (listing instances).
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system57 based on the idea that “the adversary system is an engine of truth [that
assumes] that judges are in a better position to find the right answer . . . when they
hear competing views.”58 FISA judges, by contrast, are not provided with
counterarguments or critiques of the government’s position. There is no institutional
mechanism for pointing to flaws or weaknesses in the government’s legal
interpretations. According to an in-depth study of the section 215 program by the
Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB), an independent government
agency created to examine the effects of counterterrorism policy on civil liberties,59
“there is a growing consensus that the ex parte approach is not the right model” for
at least some subset of applications for collection of “the communications of many
people who have no apparent connection to terrorism.”60 These critiques are not
aimed solely at FISA Court outcomes. Even assuming no outcomes changed,
opinions from judges with the benefit of hearing arguments on all sides would be
more thorough, thoughtful, and fully developed.61 Moreover, as the result of effective
procedures, the opinions would command more legitimacy.
Another concern regarding the lack of adversaries in the FISA Court’s operations
is the dearth of appeals of pro-government decisions.62 Prior to the passage of the
USA FREEDOM Act, which attempts to add some adversarial process to the FISA
Court’s operations, an appellate panel would almost never review FISA Court
decisions unless the initial decision went against the government—a rarity.63 The
government has always had the power to appeal a denial of an application to the
FISA Court of Review, and, in the event that the FISA Court of Review rules against
the government (an event that, as far as the public knows, has never come to pass),

57. Kerr, supra note 30, at 1516 (citing Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public
Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1285–86 (1976)).
58. PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GRP. REPORT, supra note 43, at 203; see also Peter Margulies,
Dynamic Surveillance: Evolving Procedures in Metadata and Foreign Content Collection
After Snowden, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 51–57 (2014) (arguing that an adversarial process would
improve the FISA Court’s reasoning).
59. The PCLOB is an independent executive branch agency established by the
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007. Pub. L. No. 110-53,
sec. 801, 121 Stat. 266, 352 (2007) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
The board has five members, who are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate.
The board’s enabling statute vests it with the authority to (1) review executive branch
counterterrorism actions, ensuring that the need for such actions is balanced with the need to
protect privacy and civil liberties, and (2) ensure that liberty concerns are appropriately
considered in the development and implementation of counterterrorism laws, regulations, and
policies. 42 U.S.C. § 2000ee (2012).
60. PCLOB SECTION 215 REPORT, supra note 34, at 183–84 (italics in original).
61. James G. Carr, A Better Secret Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/23/opinion/a-better-secret-court.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc
/9AKS-SZ8C].
62. Id.
63. For the USA FREEDOM Act’s modifications in this area, see infra Part III.B. In
the court’s rare adversarial proceedings, the nongovernmental party may appeal adverse
decisions to the FISA Court of Review and petition the Supreme Court for certiorari. 50
U.S.C. § 1881a(h)(6) (2012).
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to petition the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.64 There is no adverse party able
to lodge an appeal when an order is granted. And except in the rare context of a
service provider’s challenge to an order under the FISA Amendments Act or the
participation of an amicus, at no step in the process does the reviewing court hear
from a party other than the government.
2. The FISA Court Lacks Transparency
The second common critique of the FISA Court has been its lack of
transparency—another issue that the USA FREEDOM Act takes on.65 Proponents of
reform have argued that, like adversarial proceedings, transparency of judicial action
is the norm and that exposing judicial proceedings to public scrutiny draws attention
to flawed or unpersuasive rulings as well as potentially undesirable developments in
the law.66 Without transparency, the check on judicial action that comes from issuing
a public, reasoned decision is absent. Moreover, when a judge’s work will not be
subject to public scrutiny and critique, it becomes easier for the judge to engage in
incomplete, unconvincing, or otherwise flawed analysis.67 Finally, citizens are more
likely to trust in their government’s good faith when a full account of its activities is
available.
Historically, the FISA Court has lacked the benefits of transparency on several
levels, only some of which are affected by the USA FREEDOM Act. In the United
States, judicial proceedings are, as a rule, open to the public.68 The FISA Court’s
rules, by contrast, explicitly provide that hearings “must be ex parte and conducted
within the Court’s secure facility,” which is accessible only by individuals with the

64. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, § 103(b), 92 Stat.
1783, 1788 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1803).
65. See infra Part III.
66. See, e.g., The Administration’s Use of FISA Authorities, Hearing Before the H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (2013) (statement of Jameel Jaffer, Deputy Legal Director,
ACLU); PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GRP. REPORT, supra note 43, at 205–07; Alan Butler, Standing
Up to Clapper: How To Increase Transparency and Oversight of FISA Surveillance, 48 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 55, 86–88 (2013).
67. See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill & Barry Friedman, Taking Warrants Seriously, 106 NW. U. L.
REV. 1609, 1640 (2012) (noting, in the context of criminal warrants, “police officers, cognizant
of the fact that their warrant applications will be scrutinized carefully, will not bother filing weak
applications”); Ashley S. Deeks, The Observer Effect: National Security Litigation, Executive
Policy Changes, and Judicial Deference, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 827, 833–56 (2013) (defining
and providing examples of how interbranch interactions affect national security law and policy
making); George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1, 4–6 (1984) (positing that, inter alia, litigants who do not expect to prevail at
trial are more likely to avoid trial by settling).
68. E.g., Richmond Newspaper, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980) (holding that
“the right to attend criminal trials is implicit in the guarantees of the First Amendment”
(footnote omitted)); Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 570 (1976) (holding that prior
restraints on media coverage of criminal trial are unconstitutional); Vincent Blasi, The
Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 521.
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appropriate security clearance.69 Thus, all but a handful of proceedings are seen only
by a limited number of government officials.
Perhaps more importantly, prior to the passage of the USA FREEDOM Act, FISA
Court opinions also lacked transparency and were rarely released beyond the relevant
congressional oversight committees. Indeed, prior to the Snowden revelations, none
of the documents setting out arguments for the lawfulness of the government’s
bulk-collection programs were public. Since neither the FISA Court’s orders nor its
opinions are available, the American people know neither how the court is
interpreting the law70 nor what programs the government has implemented under its
FISA authorities.71
3. The FISA Court Lacks Diversity
A third target of criticism is the method through which FISA judges are chosen,
an area left untouched by the USA FREEDOM Act. FISA clearly anticipated that a
relatively diverse set of judges would serve on the court at any one time. The eleven
judges on the court must be selected from at least seven different judicial circuits72
and must serve staggered terms,73 so that the judges will have differing levels of
FISA experience. In addition, a judge may sit on the FISA Court for only one term,74
a rule that ensures that its ranks will be constantly refreshed from a broad pool of
federal judges. Moreover, the constant turnover engendered by the seven-year terms
ensures that as the Chief Justiceship changes hands, each new Chief Justice will have
the opportunity to appoint his own selections to the FISA Court.
Despite these various rules, critics highlight the FISA Court’s lack of diversity.
Of the judges who currently serve, only one is a Democratic appointee to the bench.75
In fact, as of 2014, only three of the twenty judges appointed to the FISA Court and
the FISA Court of Review over the past decade have been Democratic appointees to
the bench.76 The President’s Review Group argues that lack of party diversity can
have predictable substantive effects. Republican- and Democratic-appointed judges
often have divergent views on issues that the court often faces, such as “privacy, civil
liberties, and claims of national security.”77 Thus, the President’s Review Group’s
report asserts, there is a “legitimate reason for concern if, as is now the case, the

69. FISA CT. R. 17(b) (italics in original).
70. The Administration’s Use of FISA Authorities, supra note 67, at 84–85 (statement of
Jameel Jaffer, Deputy Legal Director, ACLU); Butler, supra note 67, at 86–88.
71. Butler, supra note 67, at 83–86; see also AM. BAR ASS’N., REPORT TO THE HOUSE
OF DELEGATES (2002) (calling for “an annual statistical report on FISA investigations,
comparable to the reports prepared for the Administrative Office of the United States Courts
. . . regarding the use of Federal wiretap authority”).
72. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1803(a)(1) (West 2015).
73. Id. § 1803(d).
74. Id.
75. Laura K. Donohue, Bulk Metadata Collection: Statutory and Constitutional
Considerations, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 757, 825 (2014); Current Membership—Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court, supra note 16.
76. Donohue, supra note 76, at 825.
77. PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GRP. REPORT, supra note 43, at 207–08.
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judges on the [FISA Court] turn out to come disproportionately from either
Republican or Democratic appointees.”78 FISA judges are also likely to come from
a background in prosecution or law enforcement—only one FISA judge has had
significant experience as a public defender.79 Moreover, given the young age at
which most Chief Justices are selected and the concomitant length of their tenure on
the Supreme Court, one person is granted the power to select all members of this
important court for decades at a time.80
Proponents of the argument that the FISA Court is merely a rubber stamp for the
government often blame the makeup of the court for this phenomenon. According to
this argument, the court does not engage in meaningful gatekeeping when reviewing
government applications, but instead simply approves them, providing the
appearance of oversight without its substance. The court’s rate of approval, which is
over ninety-nine percent, is frequently provided as evidence of the court’s status as
a paper tiger.81
4. The FISA Court Judges Lack Necessary Information
One criticism of the FISA Court that has received insufficient attention to date is
its potential for information deficits. The court potentially suffers from a dearth of
two types of information—technical expertise regarding the government’s
surveillance capabilities and activities, and information regarding the ways in which
the government is actually implementing its surveillance authority.
The surveillance programs that the court oversees employ complex and quickly
evolving technological tools. The mechanics of these tools are not only highly
technical, but also integral to mechanisms put in place to prevent misuse of
surveillance powers or the resulting information.82 Observers have pointed out that,
to the extent these internal controls are based on an understanding of the structure of

78. Id. at 208.
79. Russell Wheeler, The Changing Composition of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court and What if Anything To Do About It, LAWFARE RES. PAPER SERIES 1, 8 (2014).
80. Since 1953, the United States has had just four Chief Justices—Earl Warren
(1953–1969), Warren E. Burger (1969–1986), William Rehnquist (1986–2005), and John
Roberts (2005–present). See Members of the Supreme Court of the United States,
SUPREME CT. OF THE U.S., http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/members_text.aspx
[https://perma.cc/2U83-TZ9X] (listing all Chief and Associate Justices as well as their
dates of service).
81. Over its first two and a half decades, the FISA Court approved nearly every single
application without modification. 1 DAVID S. KRIS & J. DOUGLAS WILSON, NATIONAL
SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS & PROSECUTIONS 469 (2d ed. 2012). Between 1979 and 2003, it
denied only three out of 16,450 applications. LAURA K. DONOHUE, THE COST OF
COUNTERTERRORISM: POWER, POLITICS, AND LIBERTY 232 (2008). And with respect to
applications for section 215 orders specifically, “[i]t appears that [the FISA Court] has never
denied [one.] That is, of 751 applications since 2005, all 751 have been granted.” Donohue,
supra note 76, at 834 (emphasis in original).
82. See John Reed, Chris Soghoian on What’s Wrong With the Debate on Section 215,
JUST SECURITY, (June 1, 2015, 2:51 pm), http://justsecurity.org/23369/chris-soghoian-wrong
-focusing-section-215/ [https://perma.cc/GB3L-54TB] (decrying lack of technological
knowledge informing the surveillance debate).
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databases, the querying process, and any algorithms in use, individual FISA judges
may not be able to sufficiently understand the technology to perform effective
oversight.83
FISA judges’ need for timely and accurate information regarding how the
government is conducting surveillance has unfortunately not been a topic of public
discussion. Such information is particularly important to effective gatekeeping—no
overseer can assess the government’s compliance absent accurate information
about what the government is doing. Yet the court has been surprised time and
again by aspects of executive-branch collection activities.84 Failure to address
deficiencies in the flow of information to the FISA Court will undermine the
success of any other reforms, as the court can only operate effectively if it has all
the relevant facts before it.
II. REALITIES OF THE FISA COURT
This Part will review the FISA Court’s performance in the context of
bulk-collection programs with an eye to whether the preceding criticisms are
warranted. It will argue in Part II.A that the FISA Court has taken seriously its role
as gatekeeper, engaging in active oversight and at times imposing meaningful checks
on executive-branch surveillance activities. Part II.B demonstrates that the court’s
performance as rule maker, however, has not exhibited similar effectiveness. Instead,
the FISA Court’s bulk-collection approvals fail to grapple meaningfully with the
implications of the government’s requests. Moreover, they have uncritically adopted
the government’s legal arguments, all of which deserve rigorous analysis and some
of which are very difficult to square with the relevant statutory text.
A. Strong Gatekeeper Oversight
This Part will detail the ways in which the FISA Court has, contrary to generalized
critiques of the court, aggressively exercised its gatekeeping power to oversee FISA
programs. The power to impose gatekeeping limits on the government’s FISA
powers derives from a variety of sources of authorization and can be deployed at
multiple points during the course of the application, approval, and implementation
process. The most notable source of authority is, of course, Article III of the
Constitution, which vests the “judicial Power of the United States” in federal
courts.85 Inherent in this judicial power is a court’s equitable power to protect its
“proceedings and judgments in the course of discharging [its] traditional
responsibilities,”86 and the FISA Court is no different from any other Article III court
in this regard.87 FISA itself recognizes these inherent powers when it specifies that
the statute should not “be construed to reduce or contravene the inherent authority of

83. See PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GRP. REPORT, supra note 43, at 205; Donohue, supra note
76, at 821–22 (arguing that the dearth of technological knowledge is similarly problematic
when it comes to congressional overseers).
84. See infra Part II.A.
85. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
86. Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 823 (1996).
87. See In re Motion for Release of Court Records, 526 F. Supp. 2d 484 (FISA Ct. 2007).
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the court . . . to determine or enforce compliance with an order or a rule.”88 The FISA
Court Rules of Procedure also reinforce the idea that FISA judges may use their
equitable power by providing, for example, that judges may collect any information
they deem relevant to carrying out their obligations.89
FISA judges have put these equitable powers to work when the government
initially applies for surveillance authority, when the government seeks to renew an
authority, and in response to government noncompliance. Whether those
mechanisms suffice to bar unlawful government activity is a separate, and more
debatable, question.90
1. Government Applications as Gatekeeping Opportunities
When acting as gatekeeper to the FISA surveillance powers, a critical moment
comes at the beginning of the process—the FISA judge’s consideration of a
government application. The process of applying for a FISA Court order is designed
to be much more than a rubber-stamping operation. It is an iterative process in which
the presiding judge, members of the FISA Court staff, and government lawyers
responsible for preparing applications engage in a dialogue. In the course of
considering each individual application, a judge might insist on additional
information from the government, require a hearing on a particular issue of fact or
law, modify the government’s proposed order, or impose additional conditions or
limitations on what the proposed order permits the government to do.91
When the government seeks approval of a request for targeted, rather than bulk,
surveillance, the FISA Court has a clear opportunity to exercise its gatekeeping
powers. Just as a magistrate judge examines an application for a search warrant, the

88. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1803(h) (West 2015).
89. FISA CT. R. 5(c) (“The Judge before whom a matter is pending may order a party to
furnish any information that the Judge deems necessary.”).
90. Some critiques of the FISA approval process have identified a concern not addressed
in this Article—the infrequency of collateral review of FISA surveillance orders. There is a
robust regime available for challenging criminal warrants—an individual can challenge the
validity of a warrant by moving to bar the government from introducing at his trial evidence
that resulted from the warrant, or by bringing a civil damages claim against the law
enforcement officials who carried out the allegedly invalid warrant. FISA orders, by contrast,
are much more insulated from collateral attack. First, they are much less likely to lead to
criminal prosecution, so the opportunity for a suppression motion is rare. Second, when they
do lead to evidence used in a criminal trial, the defendant’s ability to challenge their validity
has been narrowly constrained by the federal courts. E.g., United States v. Daoud, 755 F.3d
479 (7th Cir. 2014) (limiting defendant’s access to FISA materials when challenging an
order’s validity). Finally, courts have proved hostile to damages claims based on FISA
violations. E.g., Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Obama, 705 F.3d 845, 855 (9th Cir.
2012) (holding United States immune from suit asserting violations of FISA). While the
paucity of opportunity for collateral review of FISA orders is highly problematic, critiques on
this basis are not critiques of the FISA Court’s gatekeeping performance. Rather, they are
challenges to the lack of mechanisms for challenging FISA Court orders once they have been
implemented. See GOITEIN & PATEL, supra note 21, at 34 (listing the barriers to challenging
FISA Court orders).
91. Letter from Hon. Reggie B. Walton, supra note 20.
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FISA judge examines the government’s targeted surveillance application to ensure
that it complies with all statutory and constitutional requirements. Indeed, it is this
gatekeeping role for which the FISA Court was created. And we have seen the FISA
Court operate effectively in this capacity. The FISA Court “twice refused to authorize
Section 215 orders [by the FBI] based on concerns that the investigation was
premised on protected First Amendment activity.”92 In other words, when the
government’s proposed surveillance activities threatened the constitutionally
protected rights of American citizens, the FISA Court refused to provide
authorization.
Perhaps counterintuitively, however, the court engages in gatekeeping activity
even in the rule-making context. Take for example the government’s application for
the collection of Internet data in bulk under FISA’s pen/trap provision.93 In that
instance, the court is being asked to make rules—to determine whether the statute
can be interpreted to authorize the government’s desired activity. It is facing a
question of first impression and determining whether the statute’s authorization
lawfully extends to the new circumstances that the government presents. It is rule
making like any common law court. What is less evident is the gatekeeping aspect
to this process. Again, the initial bulk Internet collection application is an example.
The pen/trap provision provides that the judge must enter an order approving the use
of a pen/trap device if the judge finds, inter alia, that the application includes a
certification from the government that it is likely to collect foreign intelligence
information or is relevant to investigations of international terrorism or clandestine
intelligence activities.94 The government argued that this language meant that “the
Court’s exclusive function” was “to verify that [the certification] contains the words
required” by the statute;95 in other words, that the provision reduced the approving
judge’s role to that of ensuring the government had checked off all the required
boxes. FISA Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly was concerned, however, about the
breadth of the collection contemplated by the proposed authorization and rejected
the government’s view on this point. She refused to concede that “FISA prohibits the
Court from engaging in any substantive review of [the government’s] certification.”96
“[A]uthorizing the Court to issue an order when a certification is made,” she pointed
out, “and requiring it to do so without resolving doubts about the correctness of the
certification, are quite different.”97 So despite statutory language that arguably

92. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, A REVIEW OF THE FBI’S USE OF
SECTION 215 ORDERS FOR BUSINESS RECORDS IN 2006, at 73 (2008). The FBI subsequently
issued National Security Letters (NSLs) to obtain this information built on the same premise
rejected by the court, thereby executing an end run around the court. Id. NSLs are
administrative subpoenas that the government can use to demand information without judicial
approval. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2709 (West 2015).
93. See infra Part II.B.1.
94. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1842(c)(2) (West 2015).
95. Judge Kollar-Kotelly’s Pen/Trap Opinion, supra note 54, at 26.
96. Id. at 26; see also Memorandum Opinion at 8 n.10, In re [REDACTED], No. PR/TT
[REDACTED] (FISA Ct. 2010) [hereinafter Bates Memorandum Opinion] (reauthorizing bulk
collection of Internet metadata under FISA’s pen/trap provision).
97. Judge Kollar-Kotelly’s Pen/Trap Opinion, supra note 54, at 27 n.19 (emphasis in
original).
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requires otherwise, the FISA judge reserved the right to look behind a government
certification to assess whether its contents were accurate. In other words, separate
and apart from making a new rule authorizing bulk collection under the pen/trap
statute, the court used the order in which that rule was first announced as an
opportunity to engage in gatekeeping as well, insisting on making an independent
determination of whether the government had satisfied the requirements of that
newly minted rule.
2. Information as a Gatekeeping Tool
A tool that FISA judges often have put to use in their efforts at ongoing oversight
is the authority to demand additional information from the government at all stages
of the application and renewal process. Some of the court’s demands for information
in the rule-making role are explicitly designed to facilitate subsequent gatekeeping.
When setting out the parameters of the government’s new authority, the court often
includes in its orders provisions that ensure that it will continue to receive
information about the government’s activities—thereby allowing ongoing
oversight—even after a surveillance order has been issued. To this end, judges have
sometimes imposed specific, extrastatutory information-sharing prerequisites for
reauthorization of a particular order. In her original order authorizing the pen/trap
bulk-collection program, for example, Judge Kollar-Kotelly specified that each
government application for reauthorization had to include “a report discussing
queries that have been made since the prior application,” as well as the NSA’s
application of court-imposed limits on the use of the information.98 Similarly, the
FISA Court’s orders have always required that any renewal application for the
section 215 bulk telephony-metadata collection “include a report on the
implementation of the Court’s prior orders.”99
At other times, the use of information requests is retrospective. This was true, for
example, of demands for additional information that came in response to several
instances in which the NSA failed to comply with various FISA Court orders. These
instances of noncompliance—frequently long-standing and systemic
noncompliance—do not appear to have been the result of intentional misconduct;
they have been significant nonetheless. One such instance came in the context of
Judge Reggie Walton’s oversight of the government’s use of both the telephone
metadata and the pen/trap databases. The FISA Court’s orders authorizing these
bulk-collection programs required that an NSA official determine that there was
“reasonable articulable suspicion” that any seed identifier used to query the database
is “associated with” a particular terrorist organization.100 This requirement is known
as the “RAS standard.” In early January 2009—more than three years after the
program was initiated—Justice Department officials learned that the NSA had

98. Id. at 86.
99. E.g., Order at 6, In re Production of Tangible Things from [REDACTED], No. BR
08-13 (FISA Ct. March 2, 2009) [hereinafter March 2, 2009, Order].
100. Judge Kollar-Kotelly’s Pen/Trap Opinion, supra note 54, at 83–84; see also Order
Regarding Preliminary Notice of Compliance Incident Dated January 15, 2009 at 2, In re
Production of Tangible Things from [REDACTED], No. BR 08-13 (FISA Ct. Jan. 28, 2009)
[hereinafter Jan. 28, 2009, Order] (describing the RAS standard).
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regularly queried the telephony metadata database using seeds that had not been
deemed to meet the RAS standard.101 As it turned out, “nearly ninety percent of the
queries to the bulk dataset” up to that point had used non-RAS-approved numbers.102
Compounding the problem, the NSA had, in its regular reauthorization applications,
consistently provided the FISA Court with an inaccurate description of this querying
process.103 As Judge Walton subsequently pointed out, this meant that “since the
earliest days of the [FISA Court]-authorized collection of call-detail records by the
NSA, the NSA ha[d] on a daily basis” used the database in a manner “prohibited by
the governing minimization procedures under each of the relevant Court orders.”104
In response to the government’s “flagrant violation[s]” of the FISA Court’s
orders, Judge Walton ordered the government—through declarants “of sufficient
stature that they have the authority to speak on behalf of the Executive Branch”—to
provide detailed information about the telephony metadata program.105 In particular,
he sought the government’s input “to help the Court assess whether the Orders issued
in this docket should be modified or rescinded; whether other remedial steps should
be directed; and whether the Court should take action regarding persons responsible
for any misrepresentations to the Court or violations of its Orders.”106 In addition,
the order posed specific questions about the program and the related compliance
incidents for the government to answer, such as who was responsible for the
noncompliance, how long it went on, how it was discovered, and why existing
oversight mechanisms failed to identify the problem earlier.107
In addition, recognizing that the pen/trap metadata program operated in a similar
manner, Judge Walton proactively asked the government to investigate whether the
same problems also existed with respect to the pen/trap data. As it turned out, the
pen/trap metadata had also been queried using non-RAS-approved seeds.108
In response to these January 2009 discoveries, Judge Walton required the
government to provide him with a report on the results of an “end-to-end review” of
NSA’s handling of bulk-collection material.109 Judge Walton’s order specified that
the report should include any additional noncompliance that was discovered as a
result of the end-to-end review, “discussion of the steps taken to remedy . . .
non-compliance,” and “minimization and oversight procedures the government
propose[d]” to apply to the program going forward.110
Additional compliance problems prompted the court to employ even more
assertive gatekeeping information demands. In addition to its failure to comply with
the RAS standard, the NSA also reported improper access to the telephony metadata

101. See Jan. 28, 2009, Order, supra note 101, at 2.
102. Donohue, supra note 76, at 811–12.
103. Supplemental Declaration of Lieutenant General Keith B. Alexander at 16–19, In re
Production of Tangible Things from [REDACTED], No. BR 08-13 (FISA Ct. Feb. 25, 2009)
[hereinafter Declaration of Lt. Gen. Alexander].
104. March 2, 2009, Order, supra note 100, at 4–5.
105. Jan. 28, 2009, Order, supra note 101, at 4–5.
106. Id. at 2.
107. Id. at 2–4.
108. See Bates Memorandum Opinion, supra note 97, at 15.
109. E.g., Declaration. of Lt. Gen. Alexander, supra note 104, at 2.
110. March 2, 2009, Order, supra note 100, at 20.
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database111 and failure to comply with FISA Court orders regarding the use and
dissemination of information gathered through the bulk-collection programs.112 To
address the violation of dissemination rules, the court insisted on a weekly reporting
requirement. Every seven days, the NSA was obligated to submit to the FISA Court
a list of each incidence of dissemination of information outside the NSA from the
metadata databases for the preceding week.113 And because its previous efforts to
ensure compliance had not succeeded in preventing unauthorized dissemination of
database information, the FISA Court took more drastic information-collection
action in that context as well.114 Not satisfied in this instance with demanding a
written submission, Judge Walton required NSA and the Justice Department’s
National Security Division officials to appear for a hearing “to inform the Court more
fully of the scope and circumstances of the incidents” and “to allow the Court [to]
assess whether the Orders issued in this docket should be modified or rescinded and
whether other remedial steps should be imposed.”115 At this hearing, Judge Walton
ordered the government to submit a report explaining how it had handled the
compliance issues that had been discovered.116 Not satisfied with the level of detail

111. Improper access to the telephony metadata database had been a persistent problem.
Id. at 9 (over two dozen analysts had queried the telephony metadata database for several
days in April 2008 “without being aware they were doing so” (emphasis omitted)); Donohue,
supra note 76, at 815. NSA responded by “suspending . . . access pending additional training”
and changing the access tool to require acknowledgment of access to metadata. March 2,
2009, Order, supra note 100, at 9–10. An audit revealed that as late as February 2009 analysts
continued to query the records using seeds that were not RAS-approved. Id. at 10;
Declaration of Lt. Gen. Alexander, supra note 104, at 8; PCLOB SECTION 215 REPORT, supra
note 34, at 51.
112. In June 2009, the government reported to the court that the “unminimized results of
some queries of metadata [redacted text] had been ‘uploaded [by NSA] into a database to
which other intelligence agencies . . . had access,’” which “may have resulted in the
dissemination of U.S. person information in violation” of minimization policy as well as the
Court’s orders. Order at 5, In re Application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for an
Order Requiring the Production of Tangible Things from [REDACTED], No. BR 09-06 (FISA
Ct. June 22, 2009) [hereinafter FBI Application Order] (alteration in original) (describing May
29, 2009 order).
113. Id. at 7. This requirement was later relaxed to every thirty days. See Bates
Memorandum Opinion, supra note 97, at 95.
114. One NSA analyst, for example, forwarded the results to other NSA analysts, at least
some of whom had not received “appropriate and adequate briefings” about the relevant
restrictions on the use and dissemination of the metadata. Order Regarding Further
Compliance Incidents at 3, In re Application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for an
Order Requiring the Production of Tangible Things from [REDACTED], No. BR 09-13 (FISA
Ct. Sept. 25, 2009) [hereinafter FBI Application Further Compliance Order] (internal
quotation marks omitted). Coming on the heels of a purportedly thorough review of the section
215 program, these revelations “deeply troubled” the court. Id. at 4.
115. Id.
116. Supplemental Opinion and Order at 6–7, In re Application of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation for an Order Requiring the Production of Tangible Things from [REDACTED],
No. BR 09-15 (FISA Ct. Nov. 5, 2009) [hereinafter FBI Application Supplemental Order].
Telephony metadata was disseminated to analysts not trained to receive it, and analysts had
queried the database using selectors for which there had been, but was no longer, RAS. Id. at 3–4.
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provided in that initial report, the judge required yet another report, this time
specifying particular information that it must include.117
So FISA judges have been quite diligent in seeking information about the
bulk-collection programs they are overseeing, particularly when they learn of
instances in which the government acted in violation of their orders. This information
seeking itself aids in the court’s gatekeeper duties. Asking the government to provide
information sends a clear signal that the court is paying attention. It also forces the
government to be more diligent in its implementation of the court’s orders. But the
FISA Court does not limit its gatekeeping activity to collecting information. It goes
on to make use of the information gleaned from these demands to address concerns
that the information reveals.
3. Other Gatekeeping Tools
There are other tools the judges have used to either facilitate or engage in
gatekeeping. One is to require minimization or “minimization-like” procedures.
While section 215 has always statutorily required the government to employ
appropriate minimization procedures, the same was not true of FISA’s pen/trap
provision prior to the passage of the USA FREEDOM Act.118 Yet the FISA Court
imposed mandatory minimization-like procedures on this data anyway, as a
safeguard for concerns arising from the breadth of the collection.119 These
minimization-like procedures included, inter alia, an enhanced oversight role for the
NSA’s Office of the General Counsel as well as requirements that the NSA label the
data as bulk collected, make it available only to trained analysts, and query the
database only on seeds that meet the RAS standard.120
Enhanced minimization was also the FISA Court’s means of remedying
overcollection under section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act.121 Section 702
permits the collection of the content of electronic communications so long as the
target of the surveillance is “reasonably believed to be located outside the United
States.”122 Due to the technical means by which communications traverse the
Internet, however, the NSA was collecting vast numbers of purely domestic
communications.123 The scope of this domestic collection, the FISA Court held,
exceeded the authority conferred by statute and violated the Fourth Amendment.124

117. Id. at 6–7.
118. USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, sec. 202, § 402(a), 129 Stat. 268,
277–78 (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1842) (adding a requirement that the Attorney General
“safeguard nonpublicly available information concerning United States persons that is
collected through the use of a [pen/trap device]”).
119. Judge Kollar-Kotelly’s Pen/Trap Opinion, supra note 54, at 68, 82–87; see also Bates
Memorandum Opinion, supra note 97, at 82.
120. Judge Kollar-Kotelly’s Pen/Trap Opinion, supra note 54, at 69 n.50, 83–85.
121. See Memorandum Opinion at 16 n.14, In re [REDACTED], No. [REDACTED]
(FISA Ct. Oct. 3, 2011) [hereinafter Oct. 3, 2011, Memorandum Opinion] (noting the
government’s repeated substantial misrepresentations of its collection programs).
122. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(a) (2012).
123. Oct. 3, 2011, Memorandum Opinion, supra note 122, at 16 n.14, 33–35.
124. Id. at 62–63, 78–79.
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To bring the program into compliance with the statute and the Constitution, Judge
Bates insisted that the government augment its minimization efforts with respect to
this material, and he refused to reauthorize the program until he had approved the
government’s amended minimization procedures.125
Restricting collection and dissemination decisions to a limited roster of properly
trained officials is another tactic the court has invoked. Both the initial determination
that RAS exists for a particular seed and the determination that minimization
requirements have been met before any metadata is disseminated must be made by
one of a small number of specified officials.126 In addition, upon discovering the
NSA’s longstanding failure to comply with the rules regarding the dissemination of
U.S. person information, the court insisted that NSA employees responsible for
handling this sensitive information undergo supplemental training with respect to the
applicable rules.127
An oversight measure that has proved effective in preventing systemic
overcollection or overdissemination is that of requiring periodic spot checks. An
early noncompliance incident in the pen/trap bulk-collection program prompted the
court to impose requirements that the Justice Department’s National Security
Division and the General Counsel of the NSA spot check of sample data, “at least
twice during the 90-day authorized period of surveillance,” to be sure the program
complied with court requirements.128 At least once, both of those offices also had to
review a sample of the RAS approvals for selection terms. And the NSA had to
regularly provide the FISA Court with a report detailing the queries made since the
last report submitted to the court, describing the NSA’s implementation of
procedures to access the metadata and any proposed changes in the collection or use
of the metadata.129 To facilitate these sorts of periodic checks, the FISA Court has
required an auditable record of NSA access to bulk-records databases.130 One of these
spot checks revealed that, from the time of the bulk-pen/trap program’s initial
authorization in 2004, certain “categories” of information not authorized for
collection were nonetheless collected continuously.131 The problem eluded detection
by the NSA’s end-to-end review or any other oversight mechanism. It was only

125. Id. at 29, 79–80 (describing modifications to minimization procedures).
126. Primary Order at 6–9, 13, In re Application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for
an Order Requiring the Production of Tangible Things from [REDACTED], No. BR 09-13
(FISA Ct. Sept. 3, 2009) [hereinafter Sept. 3, 2009, Primary Order].
127. Id. at 14–15.
128. Bates Memorandum Opinion, supra note 97, at 13 (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted); see also Sept. 3, 2009, Primary Order, supra note 127, at 16 (describing
limits).
129. Sept. 3, 2009, Primary Order, supra note 127, at 18. Initially, this report was required
when the government applied for reauthorization of the program; eventually, it was required
every 30 days. Primary Order at 16, In re Application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
for an Order Requiring the Production of Tangible Things from [REDACTED], No. BR 13-80
(FISA Ct. Apr. 25, 2013) [hereinafter Apr. 25, 2013, Primary Order].
130. E.g., Judge Kollar-Kotelly Pen/Trap Opinion, supra note 54, at 83. Access to bulk
telephony metadata “for foreign intelligence analysis purposes” must also include an auditable
record. Apr. 25, 2013, Primary Order, supra note 130, at 7.
131. Bates Memorandum Opinion, supra note 97, at 20–22.
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through the FISA Court–imposed spot-checking requirement that the overcollection
finally came to light in 2010 and was remedied.
The most intrusive oversight tool that a FISA judge has employed was the
complete suspension of a program absent judicial approval of each individual query.
When it became clear to Judge Walton that the problem of querying the bulk records
databases using non-RAS-approved seeds was a systemic one, he barred the NSA
from running unsupervised queries altogether.132 From March until September of
2009, Judge Walton ordered that the government seek judicial approval for each
individual query of the telephony metadata.133 Under these rules, the NSA could only
access metadata “through a motion that the Court authorize querying of the BR
metadata for purposes of obtaining foreign intelligence on a case-by-case basis [that
identifies] the telephone identifier for which access is sought [and] provide[s] the
factual basis for the NSA’s determination that the [RAS] standard has been met.”134
After the NSA completed its end-to-end review, Judge Walton discontinued this
requirement and reauthorized the bulk-collection program, subject to a series of more
detailed conditions on the information’s collection and use.135
From September 2009 until the President ordered modifications to the program in
the wake of Edward Snowden’s information leak,136 the orders reauthorizing bulk
collection of telephony metadata also incorporated the lessons the court had learned.
As a result, the program was subject to a spectrum of controls and oversight
requirements. Many of the procedures were simply designed to ensure compliance
with the applicable rules. So the NSA was instructed to maintain procedures to
control access to and use of the metadata, to provide adequate briefings and training
to personnel authorized to receive query results, and to implement software controls
both to limit and to track all access to the metadata.137
Finally, the court enlisted other government agencies to assist in its gatekeeping
role in the section 215 program. For example, the NSA was required to provide the
National Security Division with copies of its procedures, briefing, and training
materials;138 to consult with the National Security Division about any legal opinions
about the interpretation, scope, and/or implementation of this authority;139 and to
meet with the National Security Division and any other appropriate NSA officials to
assess compliance, submitting in writing to the court the results of that meeting.140
The NSA Office of the Inspector General was required to have a similar meeting
with the National Security Division to discuss oversight and assess compliance.141
Prior to 2011 when the bulk collection of pen/trap information was discontinued, the

132. Id. at 15 n.17 (discussing Judge Walton’s order).
133. March 2, 2009, Order, supra note 100, at 18.
134. Id. at 18–19
135. See Sept. 3, 2009, Primary Order, supra note 127, at 2–3, 5–18.
136. See Remarks on United States Signals Intelligence, supra note 35, at 6–7 (limiting use
of metadata collected under section 215 and calling for the development of an approach that
can achieve the program’s goals without the government holding this metadata itself).
137. Sept. 3, 2009, Primary Order, supra note 127, at 11–12.
138. Sept. 3, 2009, Primary Order, supra note 127, at 11, 17.
139. Id. at 16.
140. Id. at 17.
141. Id.
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orders reauthorizing that program contained similarly detailed and extensive
oversight mechanisms. None of this is to say that the protections were sufficient or
that the program should have been continued. It is merely to say that the FISA
Court’s performance in this regard has been much more than a rubber stamp for the
government.
One might argue that, rather than demonstrating the FISA Court’s virtues as a
gatekeeper, the forgoing instead shows that despite all of the FISA Court’s oversight
efforts, the government continued to violate its orders, to engage in overcollection,
and to access and improperly disseminate metadata information. Moreover, one
might opine that the FISA judges should have more severely restricted surveillance
programs when government noncompliance came to its attention.
To be sure, the FISA Court did not prevent all problems; as gatekeeper it can only
do so much. At the same time, it is clear that no matter the outcome, the FISA Court
took seriously its responsibility to engage in oversight, took action to press the
government to comply with its orders, and served as a partner in devising means of
permitting the government to continue its surveillance activities without abdicating
all limits and controls. In addition, through its demands for information, spot checks,
and other methods, the FISA Court ended noncompliance that might otherwise have
continued unchecked, prompted examinations of the system that revealed to
additional flaws, and led to the implementation of measures that should lead to better
compliance going forward.
B. Weak Rule-Maker Analysis
Given the secret, nonadversarial nature of the pre-USA FREEDOM Act FISA
Court’s operations, it should perhaps come as no surprise that FISA judges have been
insufficiently rigorous in their rule making about bulk-collection programs. While
the FISA Court does have its defenders, the verdict of independent committees,
government agencies, federal courts, and legal commentators is nearly unanimous in
finding FISA Court “rule making” opinions regarding bulk collection wanting.142
Indeed, even those who endorse the opinions’ conclusions refrain from defending
their reasoning.143 The opinions sometimes fail to grapple with the difficult legal
questions that are presented and sometimes seem to adopt uncritically the
government’s arguments, even when those arguments call for serious analysis. These
flaws are on display in the initial opinions authorizing the bulk collection of
information through the FISA pen/trap and business records provisions respectively.

142. See, e.g., ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 815–19 (2d. Cir. 2015) (holding that the
section 215 program was not authorized by the statutory language); Klayman v. Obama, 957
F. Supp. 2d. 1, 29–42 (D.D.C. 2013 (arguing that the section 215 program was likely
unconstitutional), vacated, 800 F.3d 559 (D.C. Cir. 2015); PCLOB SECTION 215 REPORT,
supra note 34, at 57–136 (describing in detail multiple arguments that the FISA court’s
analysis was flawed); PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GRP. REPORT, supra note 43, at 203–04; Donohue,
supra note 76, at 822–24 (lamenting the precedential value assigned to FISA Court opinions).
143. E.g., PCLOB SECTION 215 REPORT, supra note 34, at 208–18 (dissenting views by
members of the PCLOB); Margulies, supra note 59, at 52–53.
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1. Authorizing Bulk Collection of Internet Metadata
As discussed in Part I.A.2, Judge Kollar-Kotelly wrote the opinion in 2004
approving for the first time the collection of domestic Internet-communications
metadata under the statutory provision authorizing the use of pen/traps.144 And while
she was a strong gatekeeper—insisting on a role in evaluating the government’s
submissions, demanding additional information about First Amendment
implications, and imposing restrictions on the use of the collected data145—her
rule-making performance was less impressive. Indeed, her opinion sidesteps the truly
thorny questions that the bulk-collection application presents.
The opinion notes at the very outset that the government’s application sought “a
much broader type of collection than other pen register/trap and trace
applications.”146 The FISA pen/trap provision in effect at the time required the FISA
Court to approve a pen/trap application whenever the Attorney General certified
“that the information likely to be obtained . . . is relevant to an ongoing investigation
to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities.”147 Its
plain text indicates that the pen/trap statute envisioned collection of metadata
information from individual targets. One clue to the statute’s intended use came in
the provision indicating what must be included in a FISA judge-issued pen/trap
order:
An order issued under this section . . . shall specify . . . the identity . . .
of the person who is the subject of the investigation[,] the identity . . . of
the person . . . in whose name is listed the [targeted facility] . . . [and] the
attributes of the communications to which the order applies.148
Yet the government sought authorization to utilize this provision not to collect
noncontent information about a particular subscriber’s communications but instead
to engage in bulk collection of “specified [classified] categories of metadata about
Internet communications.”149 In other words, rather than collecting the e-mail
addresses with which Suspect X corresponded, the government sought to collect an
entire category of noncontent data—for example, all noncontent data about e-mail
traffic into and out of the United States.150
Judge Kollar-Kotelly displayed obvious misgivings regarding the application of
the statutory provision urged by the government. Recall that the statute provided that
when the Attorney General makes the required certification that use of a pen/trap is

144. For a definition of metadata, see supra note 2.
145. See supra text accompanying notes 100–01.
146. Judge Kollar-Kotelly’s Pen/Trap Opinion, supra note 54, at 1–2.
147. 50 U.S.C. § 1842(c)(2) (Supp. 2003). This provision was modified by the USA
FREEDOM Act of 2015. Pub. L. No. 114-23, 129 Stat. 268 (codified in scattered sections of
the U.S.C.).
148. 50 U.S.C. § 1842(d)(2) (Supp. 2003) (modified by the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015).
149. Bates Memorandum Opinion, supra note 97, at 2. The list of what categories were
approved for collection is not available publicly, but at the very least they include IP addresses
and e-mail addresses.
150. The actual categories of data that the government collected remain classified.
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likely to yield information “relevant to an ongoing investigation,”151 “the judge shall
enter an ex parte order.”152 That is to say, the statute seems to insist that once the
government certifies that the relevance standard is met, the FISA judge (so long as
all other requirements are also met) has no discretion with respect to whether to issue
an order.153 But the opinion rejects the seemingly self-evident conclusion that the
statute eliminates an independent role for the court in evaluating the sufficiency of
the government’s certification. Clearly uncomfortable with giving such broad
collection authority to the government without judicial oversight, Judge
Kollar-Kotelly insists that the Court is permitted to look behind the government’s
certification to “resolv[e] doubts about the correctness of the certification.”154
Perhaps more revealing of Judge Kollar-Kotelly’s concerns are the procedural
limitations she imposed on the program. Unlike section 215, the pen/trap provision
at the time did not require minimization procedures.155 Yet Judge Kollar-Kotelly
imposed them nonetheless, placing restrictions on storage, access, and dissemination
of the collected metadata. The specific restrictions were nearly identical to the
minimization procedures statutorily imposed on the section 215 bulk-collection
program.156
Imposing these minimization procedures demonstrates that Judge Kollar-Kotelly
saw the pen/trap bulk collection as severely intrusive into individual privacy rights.
Minimization procedures developed in response to concerns that collection, use, or
dissemination of some Fourth Amendment-protected material would be
unconstitutionally intrusive without such measures. For example, courts considering
the constitutionality of FISA content-collection provisions have relied, at least in
part, on minimization procedures to conclude that the collection is “reasonable” and

151. 50 U.S.C. § 1842(c)(2) (Supp. 2003).
152. 50 U.S.C. § 1842(d)(1) (2000). Arguably, the very fact that the statute confers such
little control over the power on judges is evidence of Congress’s intent to authorize collection
that was narrow in scope. See Orin Kerr, Problems with the FISC’s Newly-Declassified
Opinion on Bulk Collection of Internet Metadata, LAWFARE (Nov. 19, 2013, 2:35 AM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/problems-fiscs-newly-declassified-opinion-bulk-collection
-internet-metadata [https://perma.cc/XZ7F-PB72].
153. Cf. In re Application of the United States for an Order Authorizing the Installation
and Use of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace Device, 846 F. Supp. 1555, 1561–62 (M.D. Fla.
1994) (interpreting the domestic criminal pen/trap statute to foreclose additional judicial
inquiry once the government’s application has met the statutory requirements). But see Judge
Kollar-Kotelly’s Pen/Trap Opinion, supra note 54, at 27 n.19.
154. Judge Kollar-Kotelly’s Pen/Trap Opinion, supra note 54, at 27 n.19.
155. The USA FREEDOM Act of 2015 added a minimization requirement to the pen/trap
provision. Pub. L. No. 114-23, sec. 202, § 402, 129 Stat. 268, 277–78 (codified at 50 U.S.C.
§ 1842).
156. Judge Kollar-Kotelly’s Pen/Trap Opinion, supra note 54, at 82–87 (requiring in part
that the information remain segregated, that limited numbers of people have access to the
information, that the relevant database be queried only using seeds meeting the RAS standard,
that any queries be auditable, that the NSA’s General Counsel monitor the program, and that
any dissemination comply with existing rules about minimizing U.S. person information).
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therefore consistent with the Fourth Amendment.157 In other words, absent the use of
minimization procedures to mitigate the privacy impact of collecting Fourth
Amendment-protected “papers and effects,” FISA content collection might
impermissibly intrude on Fourth Amendment rights.
If, however, noncontent data such as the information collected pursuant to the
pen/trap statute is not protected by the Fourth Amendment—as the government
maintains and Judge Kollar-Kotelly accepts—the “reasonableness” requirement is
simply inapplicable.158 There is no constitutional reason to minimize the information
gathered from such collection. Of course Congress can add statutory privacy
protections that exceed the Fourth Amendment floor. The minimization procedures
imposed on section 215 represent one such regulation. But these limits derive from
a congressional determination that constitutional protections are insufficient.
Congress could have imposed minimization procedures on pen/trap collection as a
means of limiting its privacy impact despite the inapplicability of the Fourth
Amendment just as it did for section 215 collection. But it did not. If Judge
Kollar-Kotelly found the government’s intended use of the pen/trap provision in need
of protections often employed for Fourth Amendment-protected information,
perhaps she should have concluded that the government’s interpretation of what the
statute permits is broader than Congress intended.
Judge Kollar-Kotelly’s analysis of whether the government’s application met the
statute’s requirement that the information collected be “relevant” to an ongoing
investigation also displays her qualms that the pen/trap provision, as interpreted by
the government, was excessively broad. Accepting that “only a very small percentage
of the information obtained will be . . . directly relevant,” Judge Kollar-Kotelly found
the bulk collection to be relevant nonetheless because “the collection of both a huge
volume and high percentage of unrelated communications [is] necessary to identify
the much smaller number” of terrorism-related communications.159 Consequently,
she concluded, the applicable relevance standard did not require a statistical “‘tight
fit’ between the volume of proposed collection and the much smaller proportion of
information that will be directly relevant to [redacted] FBI investigations.”160 In other

157. E.g., In re Directives [redacted text] Pursuant to Section 105B of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act, 551 F.3d 1004, 1013 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2008); United States v.
Rosen, 447 F. Supp. 2d 538 (E.D. Va. 2006).
158. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979) (holding that the Fourth
Amendment does not apply to the list of phone numbers one dials). The third-party doctrine
that the Supreme Court created in a series of opinions in the 1970s, including Smith, see infra
notes 184–93 and accompanying text, provides that information voluntarily revealed to a
“third party,” a term encompassing any individual or non-government institution, enjoys no
Fourth Amendment protection. See generally Smith, 442 U.S. 735; United States v. Miller,
425 U.S. 435 (1976). The doctrine arguably applies not only to communications metadata but
also banking and medical records, Amazon shopping history, etc. And while the doctrine has
been subject to significant criticism, from both courts and commentators, see, e.g., United
States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 954–57 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring); Orin S. Kerr, The
Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 563 n.5 (2009) (listing some of the
critiques of the doctrine), it is clear that Judge Kollar-Kotelly accepted its applicability to the
pen/trap metadata.
159. Judge Kollar-Kotelly’s Pen/Trap Opinion, supra note 54, at 48–49.
160. Id. at 49–50.
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words, even though the vast majority of the information collected under the pen/trap
program will not actually be relevant to a terrorism investigation, the government
can only find the information that is relevant if it collects large volumes of
information. Therefore, the entire database is relevant.
To support this conclusion, Judge Kollar-Kotelly indicates that she “finds
instructive Supreme Court precedents on when a search that is not predicated on
individualized suspicion may nonetheless be reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment.”161 Those precedents establish a balancing test for evaluating
“reasonableness,” in which courts must weigh the privacy expectations of the
individual and the intrusiveness of the search against the government’s interest.162
Despite noting that she does not consider the pen/trap metadata subject to Fourth
Amendment protections, Judge Kollar-Kotelly goes on to employ this balancing test
as part of her inquiry into whether the metadata is relevant to an ongoing
investigation. She determines that the privacy interest is minimal given the absence
of Fourth Amendment protection, and the government interest in thwarting terrorist
attacks is compelling. And because the proposed bulk collection is analogous to
suspicionless searches that have been upheld under the Fourth Amendment, the
determination that the information is relevant is appropriate, despite the fact that only
a very small proportion of the huge volume of information will actually be directly
relevant.163
In other words, despite the inapplicability of the Fourth Amendment to the data
collected, Judge Kollar-Kotelly determines that the information collected under the
pen/trap bulk-collection program is “relevant” to a qualified investigation because it
satisfies the balancing test that would apply to information protected under the Fourth
Amendment.164 But this is a non sequitur. The statutory meaning of the word
“relevance” is not contingent on whether a program would be considered
constitutional if the Fourth Amendment applied. The question is whether Congress
has authorized this use of the pen/trap statute. The opinion never explains what
applicability a Fourth Amendment balancing test has on whether the information in
question satisfies the “relevant” requirement.
If the government’s desired use of an authority seems inconsistent with the level
of judicial oversight contemplated by the statute, a reasonable judge might conclude
the statute does not actually permit that use, rather than concluding that the statute
does not mean what it says. But Judge Kollar-Kotelly reached the opposite
conclusion, approving the government’s use of the pen/trap statute, but only after
asserting a more aggressive judicial oversight role and imposing minimization-like
procedures on the resulting information.165

161. Id. at 50.
162. Id. at 50–52.
163. Id. at 54.
164. Id.
165. During the seven years that the pen/trap bulk-collection program continued, there is
no indication that any FISA judge analyzed independently this interpretation of the pen/trap
provision. In the wake of compliance problems, Judge John Bates imposed additional
oversight mechanisms—beefed up the gatekeeping—but did not revisit the substantive
analysis. Bates Memorandum Opinion, supra note 97, at 82–97.
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2. Authorizing Bulk Collection of Telephony Metadata
The FISA Court’s approval of the telephony metadata collection under the
pre-USA FREEDOM Act version of section 215 also displays questionable legal
analysis and has been roundly criticized. In fact, a majority of the members of the
PCLOB determined that, contrary to the FISA Court’s conclusion, “there are
multiple and cumulative reasons for concluding that Section 215 does not authorize
the NSA’s ongoing daily collection of telephone calling records concerning virtually
every American.”166 This Part does not purport to provide an exhaustive list of the
grounds on which the FISA Court’s approval may be (and has been) assailed.167 It
will, however, briefly note some of the most problematic aspects of the FISA Court’s
analysis and devote some attention to a few less well-trodden arguments.
First and foremost, it seems that no FISA judge undertook the project of actually
putting to paper the legal justification for the program until after news of it had leaked
to the public. From 2006 to 2013, the FISA Court permitted the NSA to collect all
telephony metadata without (apparently) bothering to draft a reasoned opinion
explaining why the program was within the government’s statutory authority. The
government, to be sure, did submit a lengthy brief to the court setting out its own
arguments for the lawfulness of the program.168 But the order approving the
application was issued the day after the government’s brief was filed with the
court.169 This did not give the FISA judge a great deal of time to reach a considered
decision. Of course, given that FISA Court applications are often the culmination of
a series of communications between the Justice Department and the judge, the judge
likely knew of the government’s arguments before they were officially filed.170 And
one must assume that the FISA Court was convinced by those arguments.
Nevertheless, while the initial approval of the pen/trap bulk Internet data collection
program called for an eighty-seven-page memorandum opinion,171 the interpretation
of a different statutory provision to permit equally expansive collection of phone
records merely produced an order stating that the government’s application satisfied
section 215’s statutory requirements and setting out some (statutorily required)

166. PCLOB SECTION 215 REPORT, supra note 34, at 57. Two of the PCLOB’s five
members disagreed, arguing that, given the complexity of the legal questions presented, the
FISA Court’s interpretation could not definitively be labeled incorrect; it does not assert that
the FISA Court’s is the best interpretation of the statute. Id. at 210, 215.
167. In addition to the arguments laid out here, see also ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787
(2d Cir. 2015) (rejecting the government’s assertion that the entirety of domestic telephony
metadata was “relevant” to an investigation, as required by the statute); PCLOB SECTION 215
REPORT, supra note 34, at 57–102 (detailing why the Board concluded that the program was
neither authorized by statute nor consistent with the Constitution); Donohue, supra note 76, at
836–62 (same).
168. Memorandum of Law in Support of Application for Certain Tangible Things for
Investigations to Protect Against International Terrorism, No. BR 06-05 (FISA Ct. May 23,
2006) [hereinafter May 23, 2006, Memorandum of Law].
169. Order, In re Application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring
the Production of Tangible Things from [REDACTED], No. BR 06-05 (FISA Ct. May 24,
2006) [hereinafter May 24, 2006, Order].
170. Letter from Hon. Reggie B. Walton, supra note 20, at 2–3.
171. Judge Kollar-Kotelly’s Pen/Trap Opinion, supra note 54.
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minimization procedures governing the NSA’s storage and use of the resulting
data.172
The FISA Court did not decline to prepare a written opinion at the inception of
the section 215 bulk collection program because the question was an insignificant
one. Indeed, the government’s application recognized the importance of its request,
providing the court with a detailed argument for the legality of using section 215 for
bulk collection. That the PCLOB as well as at least one federal judge and one federal
appeals court have determined that the program was not consistent with either the
Constitution or the language of section 215 (or both) illustrates that at the very least
the application presented the court with difficult legal questions on which reasonable
minds might disagree.173 Such questions merit a thorough, reasoned judicial analysis.
Once Snowden revealed the existence of the section 215 program, the FISA Court
did issue an opinion. That opinion, however, came out of a government application
that differed from its 2006 counterpart in two interesting ways. First, in July 2013,
just over a month after Snowden’s initial revelations, the government notified Judge
Eagan during an ex parte hearing regarding the July 2013 reauthorization application
that it was working on “an updated legal analysis . . . with regard to the application
of Section 215 to bulk telephony metadata collection.”174 A description of that
updated analysis was released publicly in Administration Section 215 White Paper
on August 9, 2013.175 In it, the government’s argument that the entirety of the
metadata is “relevant” to an ongoing investigation is significantly altered from its
2006 counterpart. The 2006 version of its argument, consisting of a few paragraphs,
largely relied on the claim that, in determining whether bulk metadata meets the
relevance standard, “for reasons of both constitutional authority and practical
competence,” the court should defer “to the fully considered judgment of the
executive branch in . . . determining the potential significance of intelligence-related
information.”176 Second, nearly four of the original brief’s twenty-seven pages are
devoted to a section labeled “The Al Qaeda Threat,” reminding the court of the events
of 9/11 and al-Qaeda’s continuing desire to strike at America.177 Clearly the
government relied on the urgency of the threat to help convince a judge to defer to
the government’s legal interpretation.
The 2013 Administration Section 215 White Paper provides a stark contrast on
both of these points. First, the government never mentions al-Qaeda or any other
terrorist group. Rather than raising the emotional specter of 9/11, it is devoted

172. May 24, 2006, Order, supra note 170.
173. See ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787 (2d Cir. 2015); Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp.
2d 1 (D.D.C. 2015); PCLOB SECTION 215 REPORT, supra note 34.
174. Amended Memorandum Opinion at 3 n.4, In re Application of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation for an Order Requiring the Production of Tangible Things From [REDACTED],
No. BR 13-109 (FISA Ct. Aug. 29, 2013) [hereinafter Aug. 29, 2013, Amended Memorandum
Opinion].
175. ADMINISTRATION SECTION 215 WHITE PAPER, supra note 33. The white paper was
released after the government completed its submission to the court, and Judge Eagan did not
rely on it. Aug. 29, 2013, Amended Memorandum Opinion, supra note 175, at 3 n.4.
176. May 23, 2006, Memorandum of Law, supra note 169, at 16–17 (citation omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
177. Id. at 4–7.
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entirely to legal analysis. Second, it offers an elaborate defense of treating metadata
as relevant. This defense includes a meticulous effort to analogize the collection of
an entire database of phone records to the type of information collection that goes on
during civil or criminal discovery, reassurance that the government’s definition of
relevance does have limits, and an argument that its relevance analysis satisfies not
only section 215’s requirements but the Constitution’s as well.178 Clearly the
government felt that its existing legal analysis supporting the section 215 bulk
collection program—the legal analysis the FISA Court accepted in 2006 and under
which the program operated for seven years—was insufficient to withstand public
scrutiny. So once the seven-year-old program was made public, the government
hurried to provide legal analysis. Did the original order accept these relatively weak
analyses (in part) because of the severity of the threat? It is impossible to know. But
when the Court in 2013 approved the program just as it had for each of the previous
government applications, it did so with the benefit of a much more thorough, less
emotional, application.
Nevertheless, even this newly minted defense of the program has been roundly
criticized. Perhaps the most widely condemned aspect of the 2013 opinion is its
interpretation of section 215’s “relevance” requirement—a requirement that mimics
the language from the pen/trap provision limiting collection to information relevant to
an ongoing applicable investigation. In its May 2006 application, the government relied
upon what it referred to as the “ground breaking and innovative” decision Judge
Kollar-Kotelly had written for the pen/trap program.179 The FISA Court did not revisit
the propriety of Judge Kollar-Kotelly’s treatment of the relevance requirement, nor did
it discuss whether or how that interpretation of “relevance”— from the entirely distinct
context of the pen/trap application—should be affected by the differences between
the telephony metadata collection program, which was governed by section 215, and
the Internet metadata collection program implemented pursuant to the pen/trap
provision, which was the subject of Judge Kollar-Kotelly’s original “relevance”
analysis.180 Any thoroughly reasoned discussion of the lawfulness of the bulk
collection of telephony data would have to confront this question. If the court did so,
it failed to memorialize why it found the analogy to the pen/trap program sufficiently
apt. Moreover, as the PCLOB points out, the FISA Court’s interpretation means that
“if the government develops an effective means of searching through everything in
order to find something, then everything becomes relevant to its investigations.
The word ‘relevant’ becomes limited only by the government’s technological

178. ADMINISTRATION SECTION 215 WHITE PAPER, supra note 33, at 10–15.
179. May 23, 2006, Memorandum of Law, supra note 169, at 3. In the publicly available
version of this memorandum, identifying information about the “ground breaking and
innovative” decision the government relies on is redacted. As the memorandum quotes from
Judge Kollar-Kotelly’s 2004 opinion, however, it is clearly referring to that opinion.
180. PCLOB SECTION 215 REPORT, supra note 34, at 44 (explaining that under the Internet
program, records were acquired if they travelled through designated communications channels
likely to contain messages of counterterrorism interest; the section 215 program collected all
telephony metadata). As the FISA Court has recognized, “nearly all of the call detail records
collected pertain to communications of non-U.S. persons [and] U.S. persons who are not the
subject of an applicable FBI investigation.” March 2, 2009, Order, supra note 100, at 12
(emphasis in original).
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capacity to ingest information and sift through it efficiently.”181 Not even the
government argued that section 215 permits such expansive collection. Yet the FISA
Court did not explain why telephony metadata differs from other information in such
a way that its opinion would not apply with equal force to other types of information.
Like the PCLOB, other analyses of the section 215 program have determined that the
government’s definition of relevance was far broader than Congress intended.182
There are also several questions a thorough opinion would have addressed that do
not appear at all in the 2013 opinion. One is the question whether the government’s
position that metadata is not protected by the Fourth Amendment remains valid. That
position rests on the applicability of the third-party record doctrine, established in a
series of cases in the 1970s, including Smith v. Maryland, to telephony metadata.183
In Smith, the government had used a pen register to collect the list of phone numbers
dialed from a criminal suspect’s home phone. When the government sought to enter
that information into evidence at trial, the suspect moved to have it suppressed on
the grounds that it was collected without a warrant in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. The Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment did not protect
the information because it was information that a telephone subscriber knowingly
surrendered to the telephone company, and the subscriber therefore had no
reasonable expectation of privacy in it.184 It is this doctrine upon which Judge
Kollar-Kotelly relied in determining that Internet metadata did not enjoy Fourth
Amendment protection in 2004,185 and Judge Eagan in turn relies in part on Judge
Kollar-Kotelly’s opinion in reaching the conclusion that the same held true in the
section 215 context in 2013.186
But in relying on Judge Kollar-Kotelly’s analysis, Judge Eagan’s section 215
opinion never seriously considers whether the Smith v. Maryland argument continues
to apply with the same force to telephony metadata collected in bulk in 2013 as it did
in 2004. As an initial matter, regardless of the year, several courts and commentators
have noted that the privacy interest in an individual’s telephony metadata and the
privacy interest in the same information gathered in bulk might be very different.
This argument had even more force in 2013 than it did in 2004, given both the
technological advances that have taken place in storing and analyzing bulk data and
the argument Justice Sotomayor made in her concurrence in United States v. Jones
in 2012.187 The Jones Court held that, by placing a GPS device on a criminal

181. PCLOB SECTION 215 REPORT, supra note 34, at 62 (emphasis in original); id. (similar
databases could be compiled with e-mails, bank accounts, debit and credit card use, money
orders, vehicle rentals, hotel records, property leases, library borrowing, and websites visited).
“This elastic definition of relevance not only proves too much,” the PCLOB argues, “but also
supplies a license for nearly unlimited governmental acquisition of other kinds of transactional
information collection.” Id.
182. Compare id. at 60–81 with ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 812 (2d Cir. 2015).
183. ADMINISTRATION SECTION 215 WHITE PAPER, supra note 33, at 19–20.
184. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742–44 (1979).
185. Judge Kollar-Kotelly’s Pen/Trap Opinion, supra note 54, at 58–63.
186. Aug. 29, 2013, Amended Memorandum Opinion, supra note 175, at 8–9.
187. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“More
fundamentally, it may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no
reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties.”).
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suspect’s car to record his location information twenty-four hours a day for several
weeks without a warrant, the government trespassed on private property in violation
of the Fourth Amendment.188 Concurring in the result, Justice Sotomayor argued that
the Court should take a closer look at the Fourth Amendment implications of bulk
data collection.189 In fact, she went so far as to suggest that the Court might need to
rethink the scope of the third-party doctrine in light of modern technological tools,
calling the continued applicability of that doctrine into question, at least in the context
of bulk collection.190 As Sotomayor points out, the government’s contemporary
data-storage and search capacity means that aggregating data in bulk permits the
government to infer significant and intimate information about an individual’s
lifestyle—religious habits, social circle, medical condition, and more—that it could
not infer from one individual’s phone records alone.191 Yet Judge Eagan simply
asserts conclusively that “where one individual does not have a Fourth Amendment
interest, grouping together a large number of similarly situated individuals cannot
result in a Fourth Amendment interest springing into existence ex nihilo.”192
Nowhere in her opinion does she mention United States v. Jones, nor does she try to
explain why the courts and commentators who take a contrary position regarding the
ways in which bulk data changes the privacy interests at play are incorrect. Judge
Eagan is certainly entitled to conclude that the telephony metadata is not protected
by the Fourth Amendment because of Smith v. Maryland and its progeny. But doing
so in a convincing fashion requires acknowledgement of the contrary argument and
a reasoned analysis of why that argument is wrong. The 2013 opinion includes
neither of these.
There are several other omissions that the PCLOB discusses,193 including one that
demonstrates nicely the challenge of effective rule making for the court. An issue
that the FISA Court left unaddressed—for at least two years—was the question of
how the limits on sharing metadata covered by the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act (ECPA) might impact the legal analysis of section 215.194 One provision

188. Id. at 948 (describing facts); id. at 950 (discussing the trespass).
189. Id. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
190. Id.
191. See id.; Declaration of Professor Edward W. Felten, ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp.
2d 724 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 13-cv-03994) (describing how metadata can reveal a great deal
of intimate information about an individual).
192. Aug. 29, 2013, Amended Memorandum Opinion, supra note 175, at 9 (italics in
original).
193. PCLOB SECTION 215 REPORT, supra note 34, at 57–102 (arguing that the FISA Court
did not consider whether the government’s interpretation of section 215 ran afoul of its
requirement for the information sought to be relevant to an (as opposed to many) investigation,
whether section 215 permits the FISA Court to issue prospective orders for information that
does not exist at the time of the order, or whether it was permissible for the NSA to collect,
store, and analyze the telephony metadata when section 215 authorizes the records be “made
available to” or “received by” the FBI (internal quotation marks omitted)).
194. See Supplemental Opinion at 1, In re Production of Tangible Things from
[REDACTED], No. BR 08-13 (FISA Ct. Dec. 12, 2008) [hereinafter Dec. 12, 2008,
Supplemental Opinion]. ECPA amended an existing statute so that wire taps on telephone
calls also applied to electronic data transmitted by computer. Pub. L. No. 99-508, tit. I, 100
Stat. 1848, 1848–59 (1986) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2510). The Stored Communications Act
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of ECPA specifies an ostensibly exhaustive list of means by which the government
may compel a service provider to produce noncontent records.195 Section 215 orders
do not appear on that list. The court’s conclusion that the program did not violate
ECPA’s limitations on disclosure of customer records may or may not be the right
one. What is more important is that the FISA Court failed even to consider the
question—and therefore whether the service providers and the government were
systematically violating ECPA—for years.196 These unaddressed arguments are the
type of thing that one can imagine being raised by opposing counsel in public,
adversarial proceedings.
The government argues that, regardless of how the FISA Court might answer a
particular question given a blank slate, the court should defer to the government’s
interpretation of FISA. This might be either because the Justice Department’s or the
NSA’s interpretation of the statute is entitled to some form of deference often
extended to agency interpretations of statutory provisions, or because courts
generally should defer to the executive on matters of foreign affairs and national
security because of its superior information and expertise. And FISA judges have at
times accepted this argument.197 On this view, the preceding critiques are invalid
because the FISA Court is correct in adopting the government’s interpretation of the
law so long as it is within the bounds of reason.
But the traditional arguments for deference are not triggered in the bulk-collection
context.198 First, consider the administrative law doctrine of Chevron deference.199
Under Chevron, judges must accept executive branch agencies’ interpretations of
ambiguous statutes they are tasked with administering so long as that interpretation
is reasonable.200 There are two barriers to affording Chevron-like deference to the
interpretation of section 215. As an initial matter, it is not clear that Congress has
delegated interpretive power to either the Justice Department or the NSA in the way
that many executive agencies are tasked with administering statutes.201 If any entity
has been entrusted with a special role in interpreting FISA, it is the FISA Court itself.

added prohibitions on access to stored electronic communications to ECPA. Pub. L. No.
99-508, tit. II, 100 Stat. 1848, 1860–68 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–10).
195. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1) (2012).
196. See PCLOB SECTION 215 REPORT, supra note 34, at 91–95.
197. Judge Kollar-Kotelly’s Pen/Trap Opinion, supra note 54, at 30–31 (“The Court also
recognizes that, for reasons of both constitutional authority and practical competence,
deference should be given to the fully considered judgment of the executive branch in
assessing and responding to national security threats.”).
198. See Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 VA. L. REV. 649,
659–64 (2000) (listing some the common justifications for deferring to the executive branch
in foreign affairs and national security: “the executive branch needs a high degree of flexibility
in order to respond to complex and changing world conditions,” “decisions in this area tend to
be more political than legal in nature,” and “the executive branch has much greater expertise
and access to information than the courts concerning foreign affairs matters”).
199. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
200. Id. at 843.
201. See Bradley, supra note 199, at 670–71 (“As the Court suggested in Chevron and
made clearer in subsequent decisions, ‘[a] precondition to deference under Chevron is a
congressional delegation of administrative authority.’” (italics in original) (quoting Adams
Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 649 (1990))).
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The executive branch is therefore not entitled to deference beyond the persuasiveness
of its arguments. Moreover, many critics of the section 215 opinion—and the same
would hold true for the pen/trap opinion as well—do not consider section 215 an
ambiguous statute. On this view, the plain language of the statute clearly precludes
the executive branch’s interpretation of the law.202 Chevron does not compel
deference to executive interpretations of unambiguous statutes.
The argument for foreign affairs deference is similarly thin. To the extent that the
executive’s experience, expertise, and information advantages justify judicial
deference on matters of foreign policy and national security, those considerations are
not implicated here. The question is a purely legal one concerning the meaning of
legislation. This is an area where, if any branch is entitled to deference due to its
expertise, it is the judiciary. In addition, this is not an area where the executive is
acting in the absence of congressional guidance on the issue. Rather, Congress has
explicitly interposed the judiciary between the executive and FISA surveillance for
the purpose of ensuring independent oversight of executive branch intelligence
collection. Thus, unless the executive branch possesses exclusive, unilateral
authority over intelligence collection—a position that not even the government takes
with respect to section 215—it is proper for FISA judges to engage in independent
judicial interpretations of FISA.203
In sum, when the FISA Court considers bulk-collection applications, it seems not
to push back very hard against the government’s arguments.204 The court has simply
lacked the necessary tools to fulfill its newly minted rule-making role. As a result,
rather than serving as an independent check on the executive’s efforts, the court has
served as an enabler. The next Part considers whether there are ways to remedy this
state of affairs.

202. PCLOB SECTION 215 REPORT, supra note 34, at 99–100.
203. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
204. There has been at least one exception. In 2007, FISA Judge Roger Vinson rejected
the government’s argument that the program known as the Terrorist Surveillance Program,
which collected the contents of communications coming into and out of the United States when
one party to the communication was believed to be associated with al-Qaeda, was consistent
with the government’s powers under FISA, Order and Memorandum Opinion at 16, In re
[REDACTED], No. [REDACTED] (FISA Ct. Apr. 3, 2007) [hereinafter Apr. 3, 2007, Order
and Memorandum Opinion], despite a previous FISA judge having approved of the program,
Order, In re Various Known and Unknown Agents of [REDACTED] Presumed U.S. Persons,
No. [REDACTED] (FISA Ct. Jan. 10, 2007) [hereinafter Jan. 10, 2007, Order]. It was
Vinson’s opinion that prompted the government to go to Congress and seek legislation that
ultimately became the FISA Amendments Act of 2008. Just months later, however, Judge
Vinson issued an order authorizing essentially the same surveillance pursuant to a new legal
theory. Order, [REDACTED], No. [REDACTED] (FISA Ct. May 31, 2007) [hereinafter May
31, 2007, Order]. Under this theory, the specific target authorized for surveillance was
al-Qaeda, so whenever the NSA learned of a new al-Qaeda suspect, his communications would
be immediately available for collection. See id.; Charlie Savage, Documents Show N.S.A.’s
Wiretap Moves Before Congress’s Approval, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2015)
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/28/us/documents-show-nsas-wiretap-moves-before-congresss
-approval.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/6NAV-6FWB].
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III. REFORM
In this Part, I consider ideas for FISA Court reform, including those enacted in
the USA FREEDOM Act, in light of the FISA Court’s performance as gatekeeper
and as rule maker. Part III.A addresses reforms targeting the court’s gatekeeping
functions and argues that the court’s strong showing as a gatekeeper renders efforts
designed to address the “rubber stamp” accusation—such as proposals to modify the
process by which judges are named to the FISA Court—unnecessary. At the same
time, the court’s effectiveness as gatekeeper could be amplified by implementing
reform in an area that has thus far received insufficient attention: ensuring that FISA
judges have accurate information about the government surveillance activity they are
overseeing. Part III.B then goes on to address reforms aimed at the area most in need
of attention—the court’s rule-making performance—such as increasing the
adversarial nature and transparency of the FISA Court’s operations. It concludes that
the legislative choices reflected in the USA FREEDOM Act fail to recognize just
how inadequate FISA’s procedures proved to be for a court expected to engage in
rule making. As a result, the Act’s reforms gesture in the right direction but fall far
short of actually addressing the problem.
A. Reforms of the FISA Court’s Gatekeeping Role
This Part first explains why the FISA Court’s gatekeeping performance
demonstrates that modifications to the makeup of the court are unnecessary and then
considers the fact that, no matter how seriously the FISA judges take their oversight
responsibilities, they can only be effective if they have the necessary information
about the surveillance activities they have authorized. As neither the USA
FREEDOM Act nor other proposals that have been floated go far enough in shoring
up this aspect of FISA Court operations, I advance some suggestions with respect to
how to do so.
1. Judicial Selection
The USA FREEDOM Act did well not to heed calls for modifying the makeup
of the court and the means by which FISA judges are selected. Legislators,
commentators, and even the President’s Review Group have advocated several
different ways to alter how FISA judges are chosen to serve on the court. At the
heart of each of these proposals is an effort to redistribute the power over judicial
selection. One proposal would include judges from each judicial circuit and require
FISA Court of Review appointments to be approved by five Supreme Court
justices.205 Another would require FISA judges to be selected by the same process
as Article III judges—appointment by the President with the advice and consent of
the Senate.206 Yet another would have FISA judges chosen as follows: three by the
Chief Justice, two by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, two by the Senate

205. FISA Judicial Selection Reform Act of 2013, S. 1460, 113th Cong. (2013). The
legislation would also have added two additional judges to the court. Id. § 3(a)(1)(B)(i).
206. Presidential Appointment of FISA Court Judges Act, H.R. 2761, 113th Cong. (2013).

2016]

THE TWO FACES OF THE FISA COURT

1229

Majority Leader, and two each by the House and Senate Minority Leaders.207 Finally,
the President’s Review Group suggested that rather than lodging the appointment
power in the Chief Justice alone, each member of the Supreme Court should have
the authority to select one or two members of the court from within the circuit(s) over
which they have jurisdiction.208
These proposals represent a solution in search of a problem. Most advocates for
adjusting the court’s selection process are motivated by the concern that the currently
serving judges operate as rubber stamps. The accusation is that, because of their
professional backgrounds or their political affiliations, FISA judges as currently
selected are inclined to approve government surveillance applications without
assessing them critically. To prove this allegation, critics point to the court’s
overwhelming rate of approval for government applications.209
High rates of approval, however, do not necessarily reflect a FISA Court bench
partial to the government. First of all, the Justice Department lawyers responsible for
preparing FISA applications know the standards that must be met and value
maintaining their credibility before the court.210 That the vast majority of applications
are approved may be less about the judges’ willingness to question the government
than it is about government attorneys ensuring that their applications meet the
necessary requirements. Second, FISA Court supporters note that the ninety-nine
percent approval figure does “‘not reflect the fact that many applications are altered
prior to final submission or even withheld from final submission entirely, often after
an indication that a judge would not approve them.’”211 And finally, former FISA
Judge James Carr attributes the government’s success rate not to “spinelessness or
excessive deference to the government” but instead to the forgiving standards that
the government must meet.212 Thus, the government’s success rate may be more
about the substance of surveillance law’s requirements (or lack thereof) than it is
about the FISA Court’s application of that law.
Moreover, we have seen concrete examples of FISA judges operating with
initiative and independence. We know that the FISA Court refused to authorize some
section 215 applications “based on concerns that the investigation was premised on

207. FISA Court Accountability Act, H.R. 2586, 113th Cong. (2013).
208. PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GRP. REPORT, supra note 43, at 201, 208.
209. See supra Part I.B.
210. See Letter from Attorney Gen. Michael B. Mukasey to NYPD Comm’r Raymond W.
Kelly (Oct. 31, 2008), available at http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents
/WSJ_200811202Kelly.pdf [https://perma.cc/T435-CFJL]; supra text accompanying note 68.
211. PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GRP. REPORT, supra note 43, at 202 (quoting Letter from Hon.
Reggie B. Walton, supra note 20). But see Donohue, supra note 76, at 831–32 (pointing out
that only 2.6% of applications have been modified, only twenty-six have been withdrawn prior
to FISA Court ruling, and out of 18,473 rulings, the FISA Court denied eight in whole and
three in part). Without more information about the types of modifications that the Court has
required and the bases on which applications have been rejected, it is impossible to determine
the import of these numbers. Id. Evidence from the bulk collection context indicates, however,
that the FISA Court takes its oversight role—at least in that context—very seriously. See supra
Part II.A.
212. Carr, supra note 62.
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protected First Amendment activity.”213 And recall Judge Kollar-Kotelly’s treatment
of the pen/trap provision that specified that “‘the judge shall enter’” a surveillance
order if the application includes each element listed in the statute, including a
certification that the surveillance will likely obtain “‘foreign intelligence information
. . . or is relevant to an ongoing investigation to protect against international
terrorism.’”214 This statutory language plainly sought to limit judicial oversight of
such applications to ensuring that the application included the relevant certification;
it authorized no judicial assessment of the accuracy or validity of the statements
contained in the certification. Yet in the face of this language, Judge Kollar-Kotelly
insisted that FISA judges retained the power to look behind the assertions on
government applications and evaluate not only whether they included all the required
elements but also that those elements were accurate representations.215 These are not
the acts of a rubber stamp.
The other justification for modifying the FISA judge selection process is the
President’s Review Group’s concerns about the lack of diversity among FISA judges.
This proposal seems to assume that a more diverse slate of judges would include
members more likely to push back against government applications. But while in the
abstract greater diversity of judges—whether based on geography, ideology, or
professional background—is a good thing, FISA judges have exhibited similar
strengths and weaknesses. Whether appointed to the bench by Republican or
Democratic presidents, they have excelled at gatekeeping (when they have adequate
information) and have failed at rule making. Changing the makeup of the court itself,
or how judges are selected to serve on it, will not address the FISA Court’s true
weaknesses; the USA FREEDOM Act’s omission of provisions along these lines is
thus entirely appropriate.
2. Ensuring the FISA Court is Fully Informed
Guaranteeing that the FISA Court has all of the information it needs to be an
effective gatekeeper is one area of reform that has received insufficient attention. The
court potentially suffers from lack of two types of information—information about
how the executive branch is implementing the court’s orders, and expertise in the
highly technical aspects of surveillance operations. The former is critically important
for the court to function as an effective gatekeeper. The latter is more central to
effective rule making and will be discussed in Part III.B.
While the need for increased transparency of the court’s operations has been front
and center of FISA Court debate, the need to increase the flow of information to the
court has been neglected. Even conceding that the FISA Court does not operate as a
rubber stamp, lack of information about what the government is doing places a
significant limitation on the FISA Court’s ability to engage in effective oversight.
When the court is aware of government noncompliance, FISA judges have been able
to devise mechanisms to monitor, deter, and remedy it. But often this happened only

213. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 93, at 73; see supra note 93 and
accompanying text.
214. Judge Kollar-Kotelly’s Pen/Trap Opinion, supra note 54, at 25–26 (quoting 50 U.S.C.
§ 1842(c)(2), (d)(1)).
215. See supra notes 153–55 and accompanying text.
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after years of ongoing government violations. And while the FISA Court has put to
use its power to demand additional information from the government, that power is
only effective for so-called “known unknowns.” When it comes to compliance issues
about which the court remains in the dark, the power to seek information is an empty
letter. As is so often the case when it comes to oversight of classified government
programs, the fundamental challenge here is that the FISA Court lacks the tools to
independently verify how its orders are being carried out. We must therefore seek
mechanisms designed to determine when (or how often) those orders are violated
and to verify the government’s characterizations of its own activities.216
a. Existing Information-Sharing Effectiveness
As the now-public FISA Court documents show, the government time and again
belatedly informed the court of instances of noncompliance—noncompliance that
had sometimes persisted for years and for which the NSA could offer no satisfactory
explanation.217 For a time, it seemed that close examination of any compliance
problem simply revealed additional concerns.218 And it was not until 2008 that the
government alerted the FISA Court to the fact that ECPA might limit the NSA’s
power to disseminate information that had been collected under section 215 since
2006.219

216. See March 2, 2009, Order, supra note 100, at 12 (“[T]he Court must rely heavily on
the government to monitor [any classified surveillance program] to ensure that it continues to
be justified, in the view of those responsible for our national security, and that it is being
implemented in a manner that protects the privacy interests of U.S. persons . . . .”); Carol D.
Leonnig, Court: Ability To Police U.S. Spying Program Limited, WASH. POST, Aug. 15, 2013,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/court-ability-to-police-us-spying-program-limited
/2013/08/15/4a8c8c44-05cd-11e3-a07f-49ddc7417125_story.html [https://perma.cc/7B29
-7AVJ].
217. See Oct. 3, 2011, Memorandum Opinion, supra note 122, at 16 n.14 (pointing out that
there were at least three instances “in less than three years in which the government . . .
disclosed a substantial misrepresentation regarding the scope of a major collection program”);
Donohue, supra note 76, at 808 (citing Declaration of Lt. Gen. Alexander, supra note 104, at
27–28) (“Although the NSA had been contravening the order since May 2006 [regarding RAS
for selectors], it was not until early 2009 . . . that the illegal behavior was brought to FISC’s
attention.”). In addition to violations discussed in Part II, supra, DOJ informed the FISA Court
of at least seventy-five additional instances in which it had provided false or misleading
information in an application for a surveillance order, Philip Shenon, Secret Court Says F.B.I.
Aides Misled Judges in 75 Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2002, http://www.nytimes.com
/2002/08/23/us/secret-court-says-fbi-aides-misled-judges-in-75-cases.html [https://perma.cc
/W7ZC-K8B8], and the NSA has conceded that it has engaged in significant overcollection
under its FISA Amendments Act authority, see William C. Banks, Programmatic Surveillance
and FISA: Of Needles in Haystacks, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1633, 1655 (2010).
218. E.g., March 2, 2009, Order, supra note 100, at 13 (“[T]he Court is very disturbed to
learn that [the end-to-end review] has identified additional violations of the Court’s orders,
including . . . using telephone identifiers that had not been determined to meet the [RAS]
standard.”).
219. See Dec. 12, 2008, Supplemental Opinion, supra note 195, at 1–5.
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Promoting the flow of this type of information to the court would allow the court
to be a more proactive gatekeeper, amplifying its effectiveness and reducing the
duration of noncompliance incidents. Some of the court’s existing procedures aim to
minimize the frequency of situations in which the court is left in the dark. Rule 13 of
the FISA Court’s procedures, for example, requires the government to alert the court
to misstatements and instances of noncompliance.220 And the NSA’s creation of an
Office of Compliance is also a step in the right direction. But as it stands, the court
remains entirely dependent on the government informing it about the programs that
it approves. On at least one occasion, a FISA judge declared that “the Court no longer
[had] confidence” that the information it received from the government indicating
that the NSA was complying with the court’s orders was accurate.221
Existing rules and institutions, in other words, have not been sufficient to ensure
that the FISA Court has the information it needs. And while the USA FREEDOM
Act increased transparency requirements for the court’s activities, it does little to
increase the flow of information to the court.222
b. Comparing the FISA Court to Other Information-Sharing Challenges
The challenge of ensuring sufficient information flow from actors who benefit
from not sharing information is not unique to the FISA Court context. Consider three
information holders who might resist disclosing full and accurate information:
prosecutors obligated to disclose to the defendant exculpatory information pursuant
to Brady v. Maryland,223 law enforcement officials testifying regarding
circumstances surrounding a search or seizure that has been challenged as
unconstitutional, and intelligence officials required to keep congressional
intelligence committees “fully and currently informed” about ongoing surveillance
activities.224 In each of these areas, the entity in possession of relevant information
can benefit from keeping that information secret—prosecutors are more likely to win
convictions if defendants lack exculpatory information, law enforcement officials
avoid exclusion of evidence they discovered if a judge is unaware that the evidence
was gathered in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and intelligence agencies retain
more autonomy and flexibility when overseers lack knowledge of their activities.
Government actors’ failure to fulfill their disclosure responsibilities in these contexts
has proved resistant to reform. Consequently, skepticism regarding whether the
situation can be improved in the FISA Court context is to be expected. There are
good reasons to believe, however, that the kinds of reforms that have had only modest
impact elsewhere are more likely to prove effective in assisting the FISA Court in
acquiring necessary information.

220. FISA CT. R. 13.
221. March 2, 2009, Order, supra note 100, at 12.
222. See infra, Part III.B. (discussing the USA FREEDOM Act’s transparency measures).
223. 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that due process requires prosecutors to disclose to
the defense materially exculpatory evidence, including evidence that goes toward negating a
defendant’s guilt, that would reduce a defendant’s potential sentence, or evidence going to the
credibility of a witness).
224. 50 U.S.C.A. § 3092(a)(1) (2015) (formerly codified at 50 U.S.C. § 413a).
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A brief discussion of other information-flow challenges and ideas for their reform
will highlight the ways in which the FISA Court is more amenable to reform. First,
consider the context of prosecutors’ disclosure obligations under Brady. As
commentators have pointed out for years, a prosecutor’s desire to gain convictions
frequently results in a failure to provide the defense with all the relevant exculpatory
information. Professor Miriam Baer has canvassed the many reform proposals
seeking to minimize such violations and grouped them into three categories.225 The
first category expands the scope of materials that the prosecutor must disclose.226
This type of reform is premised on the idea that prosecutors alone cannot effectively
provide to the defendant the information to which he is entitled. Another set of
eyes—eyes looking through a lens not focused on attaining a conviction—is
required.227
The second type of Brady reform is to boost “the likelihood and degree of
sanctions for noncompliance.”228 Under current law, prosecutors who violate Brady
are immune from civil liability, and their supervisors are immune from claims
founded on allegations of poor oversight or poor training.229 Prosecutors can
themselves be prosecuted criminally, be held in contempt, or be subjected to
professional sanctions by their state bar officials, but critics point to the infrequency
with which these sanctions are employed.230 This situation has prompted some
reformers to propose that courts make more use of a wider range of sanctions,
including some that are less draconian, speculating that sanctions are more likely to
be imposed if there are options short of criminal or contempt charges.231
The third category of proposed Brady reforms involves efforts to improve “the
internal processes and organizational dynamics of the offices in which prosecutors
work.”232 Such improvements include additional training, efforts to modify social
norms, internal compliance programs, and the like.233 Former Attorney General Eric
Holder championed this type of approach when, among other reforms, he created a
“national discovery coordinator,” “required each U.S. Attorney’s Office to designate
a Brady coordinator[,] and required each office to verify that it had trained its
attorneys in Brady and its progeny.”234 Lodging responsibility for institutional Brady
compliance with specific individuals arguably places pressure on those individuals
to ensure their colleagues follow the rules.

225. Miriam H. Baer, Timing Brady, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 22–31 (2015).
226. Id. at 5 (providing as an example what is known as an “open-file regime,” in which
the prosecutor makes all relevant evidence available, and the defendant decides what to
consider exculpatory (internal quotation marks omitted)).
227. Id. at 24–25.
228. Id. at 26.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 28 (“Even in recent years, only in the most egregious cases have prosecutors
been publicly criticized, censured, or disbarred, leading some scholars to conclude that
Brady’s primary enforcement mechanism is little more than a ‘paper tiger.’” (italics in
original)).
231. Id. at 27–28.
232. Id. at 22.
233. Id. at 28–29.
234. Id. at 30 (italics in original).
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The phenomenon of law enforcement officials providing false testimony
regarding their investigative actions is another area that presents information-flow
challenges, and it is so common that it has its own name—“testilying.” Like Brady
violations, the offense occurs regularly235 and is rarely sanctioned.236
Many suggestions for reform have been made in this context as well. Professor
Christopher Slobogin argues that the exclusionary rule creates such strong incentives
to lie that the only way to reduce “testilying” is to abandon the exclusionary rule
itself. If truthful testimony about arguably unconstitutional acts would not result in
suppression of evidence, officers might feel less pressure to prevaricate. Instead, he
suggests imposing severe punishments for perjury, rewards for providing testimony
that is corroborated by other evidence, and a damages remedy for victims of
unconstitutional law enforcement activity.237 Others have similarly suggested a focus
on replacing evidence suppression with disciplinary action against offending
officers. Penalties could be extreme—such as dismissal from the force—or more
moderate—fines, loss of vacation time, official reprimands, etc.238
In both of these contexts, serious concerns about the thoroughness of information
sharing has arisen, and in both of them reform proposals have fallen into similar
categories. First, they suggest modifying the operative rule to reduce perverse
incentives—whether by making sure that the prosecutor is not the only one to see the
information in her possession, or by eliminating the exclusionary rule. Second, they
call for a wider spectrum of available sanctions for improper nondisclosure,
recognizing reluctance to impose criminal or career-ending sanctions against law
enforcement officials. Finally, they all envision a role for organizational reforms—such
as increased training and modification of reporting or responsibility structures.
While these reforms have had a limited effect on Brady violations and
“testilying,” applying them to the FISA Court should prove much more effective.
First, consider the differences in incentive structure. Taking NSA officials at their
word, failure to report information to the FISA Court has been unintentional. Unlike
misbehaving prosecutors or perjuring police officers, the NSA did not fail to disclose
information it knew to be relevant to the lawfulness of its actions; it simply failed to
recognize that it had such information. And, once it was discovered, the agency

235. I. Bennett Capers, Crime, Legitimacy, and Testilying, 83 IND. L.J. 835, 870 (2008)
(citing studies indicating that instances of police perjury are “so pervasive that even former
prosecutors have described them as ‘commonplace’ and ‘prevalent’” (footnotes omitted)); id.
at 871 (an investigation into the NYPD “found evidence of police supervisors instructing their
officers how to lie so that evidence obtained in violation of the Constitution would not be
suppressed”); Christopher Slobogin, Testilying: Police Perjury and What To Do About It, 67
U. COLO. L. REV. 1037, 1045–48 (1996); Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Comment, The Exclusionary
Rule and Deterrence: An Empirical Study of Chicago Narcotics Officers, 54 U. CHI. L. REV.
1016, 1049–50 (1987) (Seventy-six percent of responding police officers agreed that police
officers shade the facts to establish probable cause).
236. Capers, supra note 236, at 871–72 (“[E]xamples of supervisors expressing their
unwillingness to investigate and discipline officers abound.”).
237. Slobogin, supra note 236, at 1055–59; see also Capers, supra note 236, at 871–75
(advocating, as an alternative remedy, increased frequency of prosecution for “testilying”).
238. See Capers, supra note 236, at 871 (quoting Hon. John F. Keenan, The Proper
Balance: Exclusion of Evidence or Expulsion of Police Officers, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1376,
1380 (1998)).
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promptly informed the court. This means that the problem to date has not been so
much that the NSA has overwhelming incentives to withhold information that it has
but instead that it failed to recognize that it even had such information.
Moreover, even assuming that (at least some) NSA noncompliance has been
intentional, any benefit that flows from withholding information is much more
intangible in the FISA context. When police find incriminating evidence, or
prosecutors find exculpatory evidence, the value of that information for the prosecution
or the defense, respectively, is clear. The more critical the evidence, the greater the
incentive to ensure that it is admissible (in the case of police discovery of incriminating
evidence) or not provided to the defendant (in the case of a prosecutor with exculpatory
evidence). Prosecutors and police officers who admit noncompliance are thus faced
with the possibility that a specific alleged criminal—one whose crime they have
invested time and energy in investigating and preparing to prosecute—will go free,
adversely affecting both the public safety and possibly the individual officer’s or
prosecutor’s own career prospects. If the NSA fails to comply with the rules, by
contrast, the result might be destruction of the information and any work product
based on that information—with uncertain and difficult to define consequences—or
additional controls on information’s collection and use. There is no specific, tangible
result; the world is no worse off than it was before the violation (though there may
be career implications for the official). The uncertain value of the information means
that the incentives to retain it or to continue collecting information like it are not as
strong. This means that effective solutions in the FISA Court context need not
involve drastic modifications to the existing incentives to counteract the
overwhelming pressure to withhold information that actors in the criminal justice
system face.
Second, consider the impact of these differences on the imposition of sanctions.
Sanctions against prosecutors and police officers are relatively extreme—prosecution,
loss of law license, contempt sanctions—and judges have proved reluctant to impose
them. Recognizing that most noncompliance is inadvertent, sanctions would
constitute charges of carelessness, not maliciousness. They would therefore not carry
the moral approbation that accompanies charges of prosecutorial misconduct or
perjury. Judges’ and supervisors’ decisions to impose sanctions would therefore be
less fraught, especially if the sanctions represented a wide range of possibilities as
reformers in other areas have suggested.
Third, because the information withheld from the FISA Court is hoarded
inadvertently as opposed to intentionally, remedies aimed at assisting the NSA itself
to uncover misconduct could be effective in a way that they have not been in the
criminal context. Thus, internal institutional controls aimed at uncovering relevant
information could prove particularly effective when it comes to FISA. If the
challenge is to discover problems, as opposed to convincing the agency to reveal
noncompliance, then modification of internal processes could yield benefits that have
eluded prosecutors’ offices.
Yet another information-sharing challenge is perhaps the most analogous to what
the FISA Court faces: Congress’s efforts to remain sufficiently informed about secret
government activities. The President is statutorily obligated to ensure that the
congressional intelligence committees are kept “fully and currently informed” of
U.S. intelligence activities, as well as “significant anticipated intelligence
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activity.”239 This is usually accomplished through periodic briefings from the
intelligence community officials to the chairs and ranking members of the House and
Senate intelligence committees, who then (usually) make that information available
to the rest of the committee. As with the FISA Court, this mechanism makes it
difficult to uncover “unknown unknowns”—Congress can only ask questions about
things of which it is aware—and throughout the intelligence committees’ history,
there has been great debate with respect to whether this system is effective.240
The FISA Court should be able to engage in more effective oversight than
Congress. To be sure, Congress’s entitlement to information is statutorily mandated,
and Congress possesses several tools with which it can pressure the executive branch
for information should it want to do so.241 But even if Congress wanted to use its
levers of power to engage in aggressive oversight, it is like the FISA Court in that it
has no mechanism for determining when it is getting the full story, and when it should
be digging for “unknown unknowns”—even aggressive oversight requires legislators
to know what questions they should be asking.242 Moreover, as I have argued
elsewhere, legislators’ incentives press against aggressive intelligence oversight.243
And as Edward Snowden’s leaks have amply demonstrated—legislators knew about
the section 215 metadata program since its inception—even the information that
Congress does have may not be shared publicly, thereby significantly limiting its
power to impact oversight.
The FISA Court does not share these institutional deficiencies when it comes to
oversight. As an initial matter, FISA judges need not seek reelection, so the political
dynamics that limit legislators do not present an obstacle to FISA judges. Perhaps
more importantly, however, FISA judges are much better positioned to discover the
“unknown unknowns” that may exist. Whereas Congress gets a birds-eye view of the
surveillance apparatus from intelligence officials’ briefings, FISA judges are
involved with the day-to-day implementation of the various FISA-authorized
surveillance programs. Judges thus have much more detailed information about the
programs they are overseeing, receive more frequent updates with respect to the
implementation of those programs, and generally are much more knowledgeable than
Congress about the details and the mechanics of the surveillance programs they
authorize. This means they are more likely to see red flags than legislators. They are
also in a position to require the government to provide detailed, targeted reporting
designed to explore red flags and ferret out compliance problems.

239. 50 U.S.C.A. § 3091(a)(1) (2015).
240. See Emily Berman, The Paradox of Counterterrorism Sunset Provisions, 81
FORDHAM L. REV. 1777, 1811–13 (2013) (discussing deficiencies of congressional oversight
of intelligence activities).
241. If Congress wants to pressure the executive branch to be more forthcoming with
information, it may employ the power of the purse to limit executive appropriations, initiate
investigations into executive branch activity, hold hearings to publicize issues that it wants to
spotlight, etc.
242. See Berman, supra note 241, at 1811.
243. Id. at 1818–20.
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c. Information-Sharing Reforms
This comparative institutional analysis helps determine both the likely value of
existing FISA Court procedures as well as what sort of additional steps should be
taken. As for existing measures, some have come from the NSA itself. In the wake
of the major compliance problems revealed in 2009, the NSA made some changes.
Recognizing that “its compliance and oversight infrastructure had not kept pace with
its operational momentum and the evolving and challenging technological
environment in which it functioned,” the NSA sought to “address these issues from
a structural and managerial perspective, including thorough enhancements to its
compliance structure.”244 The result was the creation of the position of the Director
of Compliance, “whose sole function is to keep all of NSA’s mission activities
consistent with the law and applicable policies and procedures” as well as “regular
detailed senior leadership reviews of the compliance program.”245 The NSA has also
enhanced its oversight coordination with the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence (ODNI) and the Department of Justice (DOJ).246
These measures implement ideas similar to those floated in the criminal context to
improve management and concentrate compliance responsibility in one institution,
such as the creation of a national discovery coordinator. And to the extent that entities
outside the NSA are involved—such as the ODNI or DOJ—they also mirror the
category of Brady reforms that rely on having an independent set of eyes review
relevant material. The suggested reform they have not adopted—at least explicitly—is
the creation of a system of rewards and sanctions aimed at full information
disclosure.
Exploiting their intimate knowledge of the NSA’s operations, FISA judges
themselves have implemented some additional measures. Many of these are also
structural and management-related modifications designed to uncover the
inadvertent nondisclosure that has been so problematic for the NSA, and they
represent the kind of detailed micromanagement that congressional overseers cannot
match. Examples include mandatory spot checks, required involvement from the
Justice Department’s National Security Division—the mechanism through which at
least one major compliance problem was identified247—and periodic reports to the
FISA Court regarding the collection and dissemination of metadata and
metadata-derived information. The USA FREEDOM Act supports FISA judges’
authority to impose such requirements in section 401 where it specifies that the Act’s
authorization for the court to appoint an amicus curiae under certain circumstances
is not meant to “limit the ability of [the court] to request or receive information” from

244. Press Release at 2, James R. Clapper, Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, DNI Clapper
Declassifies Intelligence Community Documents Regarding Collection Under Section 501 of
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) (Sept. 10, 2013), available at
https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases/191-press-releases-2013/927-draft
-document.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. See supra notes 129–32 and accompanying text.
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the government.248 The Court should continue to employ these mechanisms
aggressively to identify early any compliance problems that arise.
But more can, and should, be done. The PCLOB has endorsed at least one
promising measure in the context of the section 702 program. In addition to any
audits or reports that the NSA must submit to Congress, the PCLOB suggests that,
“the government should submit with [its section 702 program applications] a random
sample of [its collection results] and a random sample of the [query terms], with
supporting documentation.”249 This in effect permits the court to perform its own
spot check of the government’s activities, bringing an additional, unbiased set of eyes
to the material. Similar requirements could be imposed on any collection program,
and the FISA Court could use this information to verify that the government’s
representations about its activities during the previous certification period were
accurate.250
In addition, existing compliance mechanisms must come attached with
consequences and rewards. Just because a particular instance of noncompliance is
inadvertent does not mean that nobody should be held responsible. As Judge Walton
pointed out, many of the NSA’s systemic compliance problems stemmed from the
fact that nobody had a sufficiently comprehensive understanding of the programs
being implemented. One solution to this type of problem is to implement measures,
like spot checks, that in effect force supervisors and high-ranking officials to pay
more attention. But that solution is likely to be even more effective if supervisors are
sanctioned for failing to discover noncompliance that they reasonably should have
prevented or discovered earlier. To the extent previous issues arose from simply
turning a blind eye to possible concerns, sanctions would improve compliance.
FISA judges or NSA supervisors could be empowered to impose a broad menu of
sanctions on officials who fail to take reasonable measures to prevent, deter, and
detect overcollection. These sanctions could range from dismissal, to loss of vacation
time, to an official reprimand, to loss of security clearance. This is not to say that
NSA officials should not be subject to much more stringent penalties—up to and
including criminal charges—for noncompliance that rises to that level. But it does
recognize that most noncompliance does not fit that description, and aims to create a
sanctions regime tailored to the level of culpability—incompetence, negligence, or
lack of technical understanding—that is usually on display. Sanctions should be
accompanied by positive reinforcement. Just as Professor Slobogin proposes rewards
for police officers that present corroboration for their testimony,251 NSA officials
who are particularly diligent in preventing or detecting overcollection should be
rewarded. Rewards could be concrete—financial bonuses or extra vacation time, for
example—or less tangible—an award or commendation.
In sum, judges and legislators should pay more attention to ensuring the FISA
Court has the information it needs to be an effective gatekeeper. And while some

248. USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, sec. 401, § 103(i)(10), 129 Stat.
268, 279–80 (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1803).
249. PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., REPORT ON THE SURVEILLANCE
PROGRAM OPERATED PURSUANT TO SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
SURVEILLANCE ACT 141 (2014) (italics omitted) [hereinafter PCLOB SECTION 702 REPORT].
250. Id.
251. See supra text accompanying note 238.
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measures already are in place, we know from other contexts where information
sharing is a challenge that there are additional ways to improve the situation.
B. Reforms of the FISA Court’s Rulemaking Role
In Part II.B, I argued that the primary flaw in the court’s performance has been its
failure to address, or to engage fully with, possible counterarguments to the
government’s position when serving in its rulemaking role.252 This flaw stems from
the fact that the court was designed as a gatekeeper, and several structural features
of that regime are ill-suited to rule making. As a result, those features as they existed
before the enactment of the USA FREEDOM Act have been the subject of
widespread critique.253 First, the FISA Court’s essentially nonadversarial nature
meant that FISA judges were not provided with counterarguments or critiques of the
government’s position. Second, there was no institutionalized means of challenging
a FISA judge’s initial analysis. While most Article III courts are constrained by the
prospect of appellate review and the requirement that they provide a public, reasoned
explanation for their decisions, FISA judges have operated on the (usually accurate)
assumption that their opinions will be the final word on the issue and that they will
remain secret. Which leads to the third concern—lack of transparency. Finally, the
court must be able to understand the technical nuances of the programs whose
lawfulness it interprets. As such, FISA judges must have access to sufficient
technical expertise. The USA FREEDOM Act purportedly targets each of these
flaws, but the result is a mere tinkering around the edges of the existing structure,
rather than the significant modifications necessary to implement meaningful
change.254
1. Adversarial Proceedings
Nearly all FISA Court reform proposals have recognized that if the court is to
continue to operate as rule maker for programs permitting nonindividualized
surveillance, its proceedings must incorporate adversarial elements.255 The

252. See supra Part II.B.
253. See supra Part I.B.
254. Measures that will improve the court’s lawmaking performance would not impair, and
in some cases might aid, the court’s gatekeeping performance as well. Given the court’s
performance, however, these measures are much more important in the context of the court’s
law-making role than they are in the gatekeeper context.
255. E.g., FISA Court Reform Act of 2013, S. 1467, 113th Cong. § 3 (2013); ACLU v.
Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 829–31 (2d Cir. 2015) (Sack, J., concurring); Remarks on United States
Signals Intelligence, supra note 35, at 5; PCLOB SECTION 215 REPORT, supra note 34, at 183
(“Congress should enact legislation enabling the FISC to hear independent views . . . on novel and
significant applications . . . .” (italics omitted)); PCLOB WORKSHOP, supra note 42, at 36–37
(statement of Hon. James Robertson, former FISA Court judge); PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GRP.
REPORT, supra note 43, at 200–05; Margulies, supra note 59, at 52–62; Letter from the Liberty
and Sec. Comm. of the Constitution Project to Members of Congress (May 20, 2014),
available at http://www.constitutionproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/TCP-Letter-to
-House-members-on-FISA-Special-Advocate.pdf [https://perma.cc/48ED-26YN] [hereinafter
Constitution Project Letter]. But see GOITEIN & PATEL, supra note 21, at 45 (arguing that the
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adversarial process is what the American judicial system relies upon to ensure that
novel legal arguments are vetted thoroughly. It is premised on the idea that only by
hearing from both parties, each with a concrete stake in the outcome, will the court
be presented with the strongest arguments on each side.256 Indeed, when a case raises
relevant arguments that are not supported by any of the parties to the litigation,
federal courts will sometimes appoint amici to present those arguments in the most
comprehensive, persuasive way.257 And while adversarial proceedings are not a
panacea—courts reach controversial or inaccurate conclusions all the time—the odds
of reaching the best results improve when courts have all arguments in front of them.
It follows that when the court is engaged in rule making, its assessment of the
government’s position is much more likely to avoid oversights or errors, and the
quality of the FISA Court’s analysis and decision making will improve if there is a
party tasked with presenting the best case against the government’s position. An
adversarial system would also force the court to weigh these arguments and explain
why it selected one side over the other.258 Improvement in this regard will produce
not only higher quality opinions and analysis, but also provide additional credibility.
If the government’s bulk-collection activities are approved by a FISA Court that
thoroughly vetted the best arguments on each side, the validity of that determination
will be more difficult to challenge.
In the context of section 215, there is reason to believe that adversarial
proceedings would have yielded a very different result. Prior to the Snowden leaks,
section 215’s bulk-collection program was renewed over thirty times by over a dozen
different FISA Court judges. None of these judges rejected the government’s position
and none wrote an opinion examining the lawfulness of the program. After the leaks,
two FISA Court decisions upheld the program, but a traditional federal district court

FISA Court should never interpret novel questions and therefore does not require adversarial
proceedings); Donohue, supra note 76, at 806–24 (arguing that rule making is beyond the
scope of what Congress envisioned for the FISA Court); Kerr, supra note 30, at 1532–43
(arguing that the FISA Court should not have adversarial proceedings because it should not be
hearing and deciding novel questions); Letter from Hon. Alex Kozinski, Chief Judge, Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals, to Hon. Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary
(Aug.
14,
2014),
available
at
http://images.politico.com/global/2014
/08/20/kozinski_to_leahy.html [https://perma.cc/5VZV-HWY3] (noting that he has “serious
doubts” about Judge Bates’ views).
256. See Clapper, 785 F.3d at 829–31 (Sack, J., concurring) (describing how the
adversarial system swayed the district court judge’s opinion in the landmark “Pentagon
Papers” case); PCLOB WORKSHOP, supra note 42, at 34 (Hon. James Robertson stating, “[I]t’s
the norm to read one side’s brief or hear one side’s argument and think, hmm, that sounds
right, until we read the other side.”); Carr, supra note 62 (a former FISA Court judge pointing
out that during his six years on the FISA Court, “there were several occasions when I and other
judges faced issues none of us had encountered before. A staff of experienced lawyers assists
the court, but their help was not always enough given the complexity of the issues.”).
257. See, e.g., Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 183–84 (1969) (noting that
adversarial proceedings become more important the more complex the question with which
the court is confronted); Brief for Court-Appointed Amica Curiae Addressing Jurisdiction,
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 12-307) (addressing arguments
challenging the Court’s jurisdiction over the case).
258. Margulies, supra note 59, at 52–53.
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and a federal circuit court—with the benefit of the adversarial process—came out the
other way.259 Moreover, the majority of the PCLOB, which had the benefit of
extensive input from experts on all sides of the issue, concluded that the program
was not authorized by statute.260
Nearly every proposal to reform FISA Court operations agreed that an adverse
party should participate in at least some FISA Court proceedings to inject adversarial
process. “Whether called a ‘special,’ ‘public,’ ‘public interest,’ or ‘constitutional’
advocate, the core idea is the same—that a security-cleared lawyer should have the
opportunity to challenge the government’s factual and legal case before the [FISA
Court].”261 The proposals varied, however, with respect to where such an entity
would be housed, from what pool of individuals or institutions it would be drawn,
who would select it, and what powers it would have.262 Other variations include what
cases that entity would participate in, what interests it would represent, to what
information it would have access, and whether it could initiate an appeal or
declassification of a FISA Court decision.
The original—and most robust—form of the idea would have created an “Office
of the Special Advocate” within the judicial branch.263 The Special Advocate would
be chosen by the Chief Justice for a renewable three-year term, and could only be
removed for cause. In addition to arguing in support of legal interpretations that
protect individual privacy and civil liberties, the Special Advocate would have access
to any documents or other materials necessary, could move the court to reconsider
any decision, and could petition for a decision (or a summary of a decision, if it
included classified information) to be disclosed publicly. Review of any decision
appealed by the Special Advocate would be essentially mandatory, and the Special
Advocate could appeal adverse decisions of the FISA Court of Review to the
Supreme Court. Critically, the Special Advocate herself would determine when to
seek to participate in FISA Court proceedings.264

259. See Clapper, 785 F.3d at 821 (holding that the telephony metadata program was not
consistent with the statutory language in section 215); Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d.
1, 41 (D.D.C. 2013) (holding that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their claim that the
section 215 program violated the Fourth Amendment), vacated and remanded on other
grounds, 800 F.3d 559 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
260. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
261. Stephen I. Vladeck, The Case for a FISA “Special Advocate,” at 7 (Jan. 7, 2015)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Indiana Law Journal).
262. See, e.g., USA FREEDOM Act, H.R. 3361, 113th Cong. § 401 (2014); FISA Court
Reform Act of 2013, S. 1467, 113th Cong. § 3 (2013); Ensuring Adversarial Process in the
FISA Court Act, H.R. 3159, 113th Cong. § 2(b)(5) (2013); FISA Improvements Act of 2013,
S. 1631, 113th Cong. § 4 (2013); Remarks on United States Signals Intelligence, supra note
35; GOITEIN & PATEL, supra note 21, at 45–46; PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GRP. REPORT, supra note
43, at 203–05; Carr, supra note 62; Braun, supra note 42; Constitution Project Letter, supra
note 256; see also Vladeck, supra note 262 (describing in detail the various proposals for a
FISA advocate and their differences).
263. This description of the proposed Office of the Special Advocate relies upon Vladeck,
supra note 262.
264. See Vladeck, supra note 262, at 7–8 (describing the initial vision for the role of the
Special Advocate).
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There was significant resistance within the intelligence community, however, to
creating a truly independent Special Advocate, and the original proposal was
diluted.265 Ultimately, the version of the Act that was enacted embraces the idea of
encouraging FISA judges to appoint amici rather than creating a truly independent
advocate. Under the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, the FISA Court
shall appoint an . . . amicus curiae to assist such court in the consideration
of any application . . . that, in the opinion of the court, presents a novel
or significant interpretation of the law, unless the court issues a finding
that such appointment is not appropriate.266
Any amicus appointed pursuant to this section will provide the court with legal
arguments that “advance the protection of individual privacy and civil liberties,”
“information related to intelligence collection or communications technology,” or
any other relevant arguments or information.267 The court is also permitted to appoint
an amicus to provide technical expertise or to approve a motion by an individual or
organization to file an amicus brief.268 As a result, the legislation includes some
adversarial elements.
Unfortunately, these new adversarial elements will produce only a negligible
effect. The first problem with the Act’s amicus provision is that it leaves the ultimate
determination of when an adverse party participates to the court. In addition to the
fact that the FISA Court—like any federal court—already possesses the power to
appoint amici, part of the value of creating an adversarial process is in having a
counterparty that may see arguments or issues that the FISA judges and the
government do not recognize. The strength of the adversarial process comes not from
the power of the courts to seek input when they so desire, but from a guarantee that
each side will be presented in its most convincing form. It should therefore not be
for the FISA Court to decide whether an opposing party might have something to
add. Instead, it should be an advocate’s job to determine when a government
application raises a privacy or civil liberty concern to which it wants to respond. The
power to determine when to intervene should rest with the advocate, not the court.269
Indeed, we have already seen indications that the amicus model falls short. In his
opinion and order of June 17, 2015, Judge F. Dennis Saylor IV considered the
question whether the USA FREEDOM Act, which was enacted after section 215 had
been allowed to expire, reinstated the relevant expired provisions and amended them,
or amended the version of the law to which section 215 reverted when it expired on

265. See id. at 13 (noting that a version of the USA FREEDOM Act that did not include an
independent special advocate was the result of “a series of hard-fought compromises” among
stakeholders, including inter alia, the intelligence community).
266. USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, sec. 401, § 103(i)(2)(A), 129 Stat.
268, 279 (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1803).
267. Id. sec. 401, § 103(i)(4).
268. Id. sec. 401, § 103(i)(2)(B).
269. I would argue that any matter involving approval of nonindividualized surveillance
should be subject to adversarial proceedings. But there may be other types of cases for which
an advocate’s participation is appropriate. I would therefore not limit the advocate’s
participation to cases of rule making.
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midnight on May 31, 2015. As Judge Saylor conceded, the question undoubtedly
presents a “significant” legal issue and may present a “novel” one as well.270 Under
the USA FREEDOM Act, FISA judges “shall appoint” an amicus to assist when
considering “novel or significant” legal issues “unless the court issues a finding that
such appointment is not appropriate.”271 Here, Judge Saylor found the appointment
of an amicus not appropriate “because the legal question is relatively simple, or is
capable of only a single reasonable or rational outcome.”272 Determining that “no
reasonable jurist would reach a different decision” than he, no amicus needed to be
appointed.273
This application of amicus provision undermines its very purpose. The entire
premise behind the need for adversarial proceedings is that there are arguments that
may seem, based on government submissions, to be obviously correct, but that when
scrutinized by someone charged with considering alternative interpretations become
less plainly wrong. In other words, the point is to ensure that, when faced with a
significant or novel legal issue, the FISA judge will have the benefit of arguments on
both sides of the question. A unilateral conclusion that reasonable jurists necessarily
would decide the issue only one way is the very one-sided decision making that the
amicus provision was meant to prevent.
This is not to say that Judge Saylor’s conclusion that the USA FREEDOM Act
reinstated and amended the pre-sunset version of section 215 is implausible. It is not,
however, the slam dunk that Saylor portrays it to be. Indeed, a purely textual reading
of the USA FREEDOM Act demands the opposite conclusion. The version of section
215 enacted in the PATRIOT Act very clearly ceased to be operable law at midnight
on May 31, 2015.274 So when the USA FREEDOM Act was passed and signed into
law on June 2, 2015, the law already had reverted to its pre-PATRIOT Act form. The
USA FREEDOM Act says nothing about reinstating a different version of section
215 or retroactively extending its sunset beyond June 1, 2015. Any conclusion that
it did so requires a judge to look behind the language of the statute for extratextual
evidence of a contrary congressional intent. Presumably these are the types of
arguments that an amicus would have raised.
Moreover, Saylor ignores additional benefits that an amicus’s involvement would
yield. Even if Saylor’s legal conclusion is correct, there is value in having novel
questions resolved with the benefit of an adversary, because that will lead to
higher- quality opinions, more well-thought-out arguments, and, consequently,
added public legitimacy. Indeed, Saylor recognizes that an amicus “might help to
develop and refine arguments and to clarify the reasoning of the court.”275

270. Memorandum Opinion at 5, In re Applications of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
for Orders Requiring the Production of Tangible Things, Nos. BR 15-77, 15-78 (FISA Ct. June
17, 2015) [hereinafter June 17, 2015, Memorandum Opinion] (internal quotation marks
omitted).
271. Sec. 401, § 103(i)(2)(A), 129 Stat. 279.
272. June 17, 2015, Memorandum Opinion, supra note 271, at 5.
273. Id. at 6.
274. PATRIOT Sunsets Extension Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-14, sec. 2, 125 Stat. 216,
216 (extending the sunset for section 2015 to June 1, 2015).
275. Id. at 6 n.8.
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Nevertheless, he eschews use of the mechanism here, and posits that in cases
where amici would “result in some degree of additional expense and delay,” they
should not be employed.276 Such considerations cannot be what Congress had in
mind when permitting the FISA Court to decline to appoint an amicus when it was
not “appropriate.”277 Employing an amicus in the FISA Court process will always
result in some degree of additional expense and delay. It will use additional judicial
resources. A briefing schedule that permits responses and replies will extend the time
between a government filing and a final order. It will require additional hours from
government lawyers and possibly even payment to compensate amici. So if it is not
appropriate to use an amicus when it will result in any additional delay and expense,
it is never appropriate to use an amicus. But Congress’s determination in passing the
USA FREEDOM Act was that the tradeoff here—some additional time and expense
in return for a more effective, accurate legal process—was worthwhile. That decision
is not the FISA Court judges’ to make. It is a legislative judgment embedded in the
law they must apply. The ineffectiveness of the amicus provision in the first time a
FISA judge was faced with the obligation to appoint one demonstrates that when it
comes to adding adversarial procedure, the USA FREEDOM Act falls short of what
is required.
2. Appeals
Another critical reform to any process through which the FISA Court engages in
rule making is providing the means to pursue appeals of progovernment decisions.
Appeals, an inherent feature of an adversarial system, play a crucial role in any
judicial rule making power. When novel questions of law are presented to a court,
we do not necessarily expect them to be resolved perfectly the first time a court takes
them under consideration. Rather, appeals courts review lower courts’ reasoning due
to the fact that “[c]ourts of appeals . . . are structurally suited to the collaborative
juridical process that promotes decisional accuracy.”278 In the words of Justice
Frankfurter, “that fruitful interchange of minds which is indispensable to thoughtful,
unhurried decision and its formulation in learned and impressive opinions” can come
only with “discussion,” “reflection,” and “study.”279 In other words, the most
effective analysis of questions of law is a collaborative one, necessarily involving
multiple judges. And while a single FISA judge is of course capable of great
reflection and study, discussion—and the collaborative process it reflects—can come
only with a panel of judges. Moreover, the prospect of judicial review “should
encourage a district court to explicate with care the basis for its legal conclusions.”280

276. Id. at 5 n.7.
277. Sec. 401, § 103 (i)(2)(A), 129 Stat. 279; see Elizabeth Goitein, The FISC’s Newest
Opinion: Proof of the Need for an Amicus, JUST SECURITY (June 23, 2015, 9:43 AM),
https://www.justsecurity.org/24134/fiscs-newest-opinion-proof-amicus/
[https://perma.cc/MTU4-H3LE].
278. Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 232 (1991).
279. Id. (quoting Dick v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 437, 458–59 (1959) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting)).
280. Id. at 233.
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Thus the very availability of appellate review should improve the quality of the initial
judges’ opinions.
Prior to the passage of the USA FREEDOM Act, only the government had the
power to appeal most FISA Court decisions; thus, those decisions were rarely subject
to this collaborative review process. Novel and complex legal questions have
therefore been left in the hands of the one man or woman who happened to be on
duty the week that they arose. This system compounded the FISA Court’s failure to
fully analyze the government’s justification for the bulk-collection programs by
providing that one FISA judge’s decision was in essence the final word on the
subject.
The government is fond of defending the telephony metadata bulk collection
program with the argument that fifteen federal judges have approved it. But what is
likely a more accurate description is that one judge approved it, and fourteen others
(as well as Congress) declined to challenge their colleague’s conclusion. Moreover,
as FISA Court orders addressing novel questions serve as persuasive authority in
subsequent cases, one could argue that no judge considered the definition of
“relevance” in the bulk telephony context. Rather, the first FISA judge faced with a
section 215 application for bulk collection of telephony data simply relied upon
Judge Kollar-Kotelly’s interpretation of “relevance” in the pen/trap context, and all
subsequent judges faced with the question (as well as Congress) accepted that
interpretation.281
Moreover, existing debates ignore the fact that the errors emerging from the FISA
Court appeals system will not occur at random. Assuming that appeals courts will
not reach the proper result 100 percent of the time, FISA’s asymmetrical appeals
structure, which permits only the government to appeal adverse decisions, has
predictable effects on both the outcome of cases and the development of the
substantive law. As an initial matter, permitting only the government to appeal means
that any erroneous judgments are more likely to be “wrong” in the government’s
favor—in other words, the FISA Court and FISA Court of Review are more likely to
approve surveillance requests that should have been denied than to deny requests that
should have been granted.282 This is an intuitive result. For any application that
should be denied, the government has two opportunities to convince a court that it
should be approved. First, there is the FISA judge. As no decision maker is perfect,
the FISA Court will at times grant orders it should deny—in other words, the FISA
judge will sometimes issue false positives—and there is no means to subject that
(incorrect) decision to appellate review. If the FISA judge does deny a government
application, however, the government may appeal to the FISA Court of Review,
which is also fallible and therefore will sometimes erroneously overturn a FISA
judge’s (appropriate) denial of a surveillance order. In other words, the asymmetrical
appeals system is more likely to produce false positives (granting surveillance orders
that should not have been granted) than to suffer from false negatives (denying a
surveillance order that should have been granted).

281. See supra text accompanying notes 186–87.
282. See Aziz Z. Huq, Forum Choice for Terrorism Suspects, 61 DUKE L.J. 1415, 1464–66
(2012) (explaining how systems of sequential decision making can lead to more false positives
than false negatives).
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Limiting appeals to the government might also have the effect of pushing the
development of the law in the government’s favor.283 A FISA judge can avoid
generating appeals and the concomitant possibility of reversal by granting the
government’s order. This means that even eliminating all other possible causes of
progovernment bias, the judges have incentives to grant all plausible surveillance
orders. Thus the applications that are denied and appealed will represent the most
aggressive government surveillance efforts. Sometimes the appeals court will also
deny that application. But sometimes it may grant it, thereby expanding the scope of
permissible surveillance operations. As this process repeats itself over time,
surveillance authorities will therefore slowly grow broader. Of course, so far as we
know, the FISA Court of Review is rarely asked to review denied applications
(probably because there are almost none), so the process in this context would be
very slow indeed. It is, nevertheless, a likely result of limiting appeals to the
government.
Again, the USA FREEDOM Act adopted a toothless solution to this problem. It
provides that the FISA Court “shall certify for review to the [FISA Court of Review]
any question of law . . . that the court determines warrants such review because of a
need for uniformity or because . . . [it] would serve the interests of justice.”284 This
provides a mechanism for judicial review of FISA judge rule-making decisions that
the government does not control. The Act should, however, have granted the amicus
the right to request reconsideration of FISA Court decisions as well, to appeal FISA
Court or FISA Court of Review decisions, and to participate in those appeals.285 An
adversarial process with no power to appeal is not a true adversarial process. If the
amicus’s role is to represent the interests of the American people, we must establish
a system that allows her to do so at her own discretion and at all states of litigation,
rather than leaving it to the court.
3. Transparency
FISA Court critics proposed several ways to increase the transparency of the
court’s operations and opinions. Transparency of judicial decisions is critical for
oversight of the government generally, including oversight of the courts. Had the
court’s opinions interpreting the meaning of “relevant” in the pen/trap statute and
section 215 been public when they were initially issued, the USA FREEDOM Act
itself might have passed years ago. Indeed, one only needs to look at the impetus for

283. This argument is derived from Professor Jonathan Masur’s assessment of the patent
application process. Jonathan Masur, Patent Inflation, 121 YALE L.J. 470 (2011); see also
Huq, supra note 283, at 1467–68 (applying Masur’s argument to the context of terrorism
detention decisions).
284. USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, sec. 401, § 103(j), 129 Stat. 268,
280–81 (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1803).
285. Other proposals were more in line with the original version of the USA FREEDOM
Act. See PCLOB SECTION 215 REPORT, supra note 34, at 187–88 (agreeing that more
opportunity for appellate review is desirable and that the advocate should have a role in calling
for review). At the opposite end of the spectrum, the Constitution Project, a nonpartisan think
tank, argues that all FISA Court decisions should be automatically subject to appellate review.
Constitution Project Letter, supra note 256.
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the recent public and legislative debate over surveillance—massive leaks of secret
information, including secret FISA Court orders and opinions—to recognize the way
in which transparency promotes accountability and more thoroughly vetted policy.
Making judicial decisions available to the public exposes flawed or unpersuasive
rulings as well as potentially undesirable developments in the law. Some of the
proposals for increased transparency were aimed at informing the public at large.
Others were designed to ensure that Congress—or some portion of Congress, such
as its intelligence committees—is sufficiently informed to facilitate its own oversight
activities.
The USA FREEDOM Act attempted to address transparency in both the public
and congressional contexts. Section 602 of the Act provides that the Director of
National Intelligence and the Attorney General “shall conduct a declassification
review of each decision, order, or opinion issued by the [FISA Court or the FISA
Court of Review] that includes a significant construction or interpretation of any
provision of law . . . [and] make publicly available to the greatest extent practicable
each such decision, order, or opinion.”286 This provision will make more FISA Court
opinions that engage in rule making available to the public. And while FISA already
required that the Attorney General report all opinions that include significant
construction or interpretation of FISA to the congressional intelligence oversight
committees,287 another section of the USA FREEDOM Act ensures that those
opinions also promptly make their way to Congress.288
These provisions, while promising, suffer from flaws similar to the amicus and
the appeals provisions. As with oversight of any classified or otherwise secret
operations, there is a fundamental tension between transparency and intelligence
collection.289 Because they are responsible for maximizing intelligence collection
effectiveness, members of the intelligence community itself cannot serve as
independent arbiters of what should be made public. They will tend to value
intelligence over transparency, and they will tend to have extremely low tolerance
for any risk that transparency might pose. The USA FREEDOM Act, however,
assigns to executive branch officials the decision whether an opinion qualifies for
being made publicly available—that is, whether it is a “significant construction or
interpretation of any provision of law.”290 Moreover, the Act requires that the
Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney General make FISA Court

286. USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, Sec. 402, § 602(a), 129 Stat. 268,
281 (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1872).
287. 50 U.S.C. § 1871(a)(5) (2012); USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23,
sec. 604, § 601(c)(1), 129 Stat. 268, 297 (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1871). Some proposals
went further, calling for public access to all FISA Court opinions—fully, in redacted form, or
by summary—that interpret the scope, meaning, or constitutionality of FISA. The
Administration’s Use of FISA Authorities: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
113th Cong. 16 (2013) (written statement of Jameel Jaffer, ACLU Deputy Legal Director, and
Laura W. Murphy, Director, ACLU Washington Legislative Office).
288. Sec. 604, § 601(c)(1), 129 Stat. 268, 297.
289. Cf., e.g., Emily Berman, Regulating Domestic Intelligence Collection, 71 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 3 (2014).
290. Sec. 402(a)(2), § 602(b), 129 Stat. at 281 (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1872).
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opinions publicly available only “to the greatest extent practicable.”291 In addition,
the Director of National Intelligence may waive the declassification requirement
altogether if “necessary to protect the national security of the United States or
properly classified intelligence sources or methods.”292 These exceptions are likely
to swallow the rule.
Another flaw in the USA FREEDOM Act transparency provision is that it is
limited to FISA Court decisions, orders, and opinions. There may be instances in
which true transparency calls for additional documents to be released—submissions
to the court, for example, or transcripts of proceedings.
4. Promoting the FISA Court’s Use of Technical Expertise
Another meaningful step toward ensuring a more effective rule making
performance by the FISA Court—and one that the USA FREEDOM Act partially
embraced—is to ensure that FISA judges have access to increased technical
expertise. The NSA’s surveillance programs make use of the latest, cutting-edge
technology. This technology is complex and constantly evolving. Indeed, some of
the compliance issues that the NSA experienced have stemmed from the fact that
“from a technical standpoint, there was no single person [at the NSA] who had a
complete technical understanding of the . . . system architecture.”293 Moreover,
compliance measures are more and more frequently built into the surveillance
programs themselves as filters, or limits on searches, or firewalls on access to
particular databases. Software fixes, for example, sought to prevent queries using
non-RAS-approved identifiers after the NSA discovered that non-RAS-approved
queries were accessing the metadata databases.294 Judges need to be aware of the
oversight opportunity that such software-based mechanisms present, as well as their
limitations. Thus to fully understand both the programs it is overseeing and whether
existing compliance or minimization procedures are going to be effective in carrying
out the court’s orders, the court must be able to understand and assess complex
surveillance technology and software.295
The USA FREEDOM Act—consistent with recommendations from both the
President’s Review Group296 and the PCLOB297—took one step to improve the

291. Id. sec. 402(a)(2), § 602(a), 129 Stat. at 281.
292. Id. sec. 402(a)(2), § 602(c), 129 Stat. at 281.
293. Declaration of Lieutenant General Keith B. Alexander at 18–19, In re Production of
Tangible Things from [REDACTED], No. BR 08-13 (Feb. 13, 2009).
294. Supplemental Declaration of Lieutenant General Keith B. Alexander at 9–10, United
States Army, Director of the National Security Agency, In re Production of Tangible Things
from [REDACTED], No. BR 08-13 (FISA Ct. Feb. 25, 2009).
295. PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GRP. REPORT, supra note 43, at 205 (asserting that “the FISC
should be able to call on independent technologists . . . who do not report to NSA or
Department of Justice”); see also Laura K. Donohue, FISA Reform, 10 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y INFO.
SOC’Y 599, at 626–27 (2014) (arguing that the FISA Court needs a science and technology
expert “to help the court to understand new and emerging technologies”).
296. PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GRP. REPORT, supra note 43, at 205 (recommending that the
FISA Court be able to call upon independent technologists).
297. PCLOB SECTION 215 REPORT, supra note 34, at 184–89 (recommending that the FISA

2016]

THE TWO FACES OF THE FISA COURT

1249

court’s available expertise. Section 402 of that Act facilitates increased access to
technical expertise by providing that the court “may appoint an individual or
organization to . . . provide technical expertise, in any instance as such court deems
appropriate.”298 As with the amicus provision, however, this gives the Court no
authority that it did not already have under its inherent powers. Perhaps Congress’s
suggestion to make use of this power will make FISA judges more likely to do so,
but it is unclear that this provision will result in actual change.
I would suggest an additional measure toward promoting expertise: removing the
term limit for FISA judges. To the extent there is a shortfall of technical knowledge
on the court, it is compounded by the way the court operates. First, recall that each
judge may serve only one seven-year term. So after accumulating seven years’ worth
of expertise on both the complicated legal regime governing FISA and the
technology implementing that regime, one FISA judge is replaced by another who
lacks this expertise. Similar concerns about personnel turnover sapping expertise
prompted the abolition of term limits on the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence.299 Just as members of Congress develop expertise in the issues over
which the committees on which they sit exercise jurisdiction, FISA judges develop
expertise in their time on the court. This expertise should be retained rather than
dismissed.
A final thought on boosting the FISA Court’s rule-making chops. It is not clear
that encouraging the court to parse more carefully the government’s bulk-collection
arguments will result in a net increase in privacy protections. To be sure, it might
result in a more narrowly conscribed interpretation of FISA, but that is not the same
thing. When one route of intelligence collection is limited, the government has often
implemented alternatives that might yield even larger losses in privacy. When the
Bush Administration felt too constrained by FISA in the wake of 9/11, for example,
it implemented the Terrorist Surveillance Program, a new, secret program with
broader surveillance authority than even the most forgiving interpretation of FISA
provided.300 Similarly, on a more granular level, when the FBI has been refused
individual section 215 orders, it has at times acquired the same information through
the use of National Security Letters (a form of administrative subpoena), which do
not have the benefit of any judicial oversight.301 So we must acknowledge the
possibility that denial of statutorily approved surveillance might result in a similar

Court both take advantage of its inherent power to appoint technical experts to assist it in
reviewing voluminous or technical materials and amend its rules to allow that, when faced
with difficult technological questions, FISA judges can “call upon outside lawyers . . . to offer
analysis of legal or technical issues”).
298. USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, sec. 401, § 103(i)(2)(B), 129 Stat.
268, 279 (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1803).
299. See S. RES 445, 108th Cong. (2004) (enacted); NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST
ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 421 (2004) (“Members should
serve indefinitely on the intelligence committees, without set terms, thereby letting them
accumulate expertise.”).
300. James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 16, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/16/politics/bush-lets-us-spy-on
-callers-without-courts.html [https://perma.cc/5BCT-NQSS].
301. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
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form of surveillance, though less transparent and less-fully supervised, under
executive authority.
CONCLUSION
As the FISA Court approaches its fourth decade, it is being asked to do more than
ever before, and certainly more than Congress envisioned for it in 1978. Looking at
the different roles the court now plays makes plain that the magnitude of the post
9/11 changes assigning to the court rule-making responsibilities has been
underappreciated. The USA FREEDOM Act sought to address some of the court’s
rule-making deficiencies. Its minor modifications to the court’s proceedings,
however, fail to account for the unique challenges of rule-making and are therefore
doomed to fail. Moreover, Congress passed up a prime opportunity to render even
more effective the court’s already laudable gatekeeping activities by focusing on the
flow of information from the executive to the FISA Court.

